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PREVENTING PARKLAND: A WORKABLE FOURTH
AMENDMENT STANDARD FOR SEARCHING JUVENILES’
SMARTPHONES AMID SCHOOL THREATS IN A
POST-PARKLAND WORLD
Andrew Mueller*
ABSTRACT
On February 14, 2018, Nikolas Cruz, age nineteen, went to the Marjory Stoneman
Douglas High School campus in Parkland, Florida, armed with an AR-15 rifle.1 He
opened fire, killing seventeen students.2 His unspeakable actions culminated in an
attack, which eclipsed the 1999 Columbine High School Massacre to become the dead-
liest school shooting at a high school in American history.3 In the immediate months
following this still-recent tragedy, schools across the United States were flooded
with “copycat” threats of violence.4 Terroristic threat charges levied against juveniles
have likewise skyrocketed.5
These recent events have resulted in new and burdensome pressures for schools and
juveniles alike. In an age in which smart phones and social media are ubiquitous
hallmarks of American youth culture, saturating nearly every grade level and socioeco-
nomic stratum, schools must respond to the contemporary and evolving challenge
* Emory University School of Law, JD, 2020; Furman University, BA, 2014. I would
like to thank Professor Randee J. Waldman for her invaluable direction. More than that, I
would like to thank her for her efforts defending indigent juvenile children in Chicago, New
York, and Atlanta and the example she sets as a mentor, practitioner, and professor. I might
not remember Property, and I might not want to remember Contracts, but I will always
remember the Barton Juvenile Defender Clinic. I would also like to thank my loving wife,
Katherine Martin Mueller, a brilliant attorney and the sharpest writer I know. Finally, special
thanks to the William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal staff for its hard work amid the COVID-
19 pandemic and corresponding uncertainty.
1 America’s Deadliest Mass Shootings Over Last 2 Years, POLITICO (Aug. 4, 2019, 11:42
AM), https://www.politico.com/story/2019/08/04/deadly-shootings-1445953 [https://perma.cc
/KYT9-L9A4]; Elizabeth Chuck et al., 17 Killed in Mass Shooting at High School in Parkland,
Florida, NBC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2018, 10:20 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/po
lice-respond-shooting-parkland-florida-high-school-n848101 [https://perma.cc/JYE5-ZP82].
2 America’s Deadliest Shootings Over Last 2 Years, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 Tawnell D. Hobbs, Schools Take Zero-Tolerance Approach to Threats After Parkland
Shooting, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 22, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/schools
-take-zero-tolerance-approach-to-threats-after-parkland-shooting-1524394800 [https://perma
.cc/XP4K-ZABX].
5 See id. (indicating there were 350 charges nationwide during the first two months after
the Parkland shootings).
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of maintaining school safety amid threats prepared and delivered on smartphone-
accessible apps like Twitter, Instagram, and Snapchat. Law enforcement officials,
at the behest of school officials whose chief concern is to prevent the next “Parkland,”
appear to be addressing this issue aggressively and charging juveniles with more
crimes than before.6 Whereas a search of a student’s locker, backpack, or notebook
used to suffice, she now carries a smartphone capable of storing, transmitting, and ac-
cessing private information and ideas, which exist far beyond the physical form of the
device itself. Even when students’ Fourth Amendment rights have been curtailed by a
warrantless search of her belongings, rightly or wrongly, courts have been unwilling to
tip the scales against school administrators7—but smartphones complicate the matter.
This Comment promotes a compromise aimed at addressing two timely and
related concerns: protecting students’ safety and defending students’ privacy. First, the
Supreme Court should enunciate a new standard for searching students’ smartphones
on school grounds. A new standard will provide clarity for school officials and stu-
dents alike and will illuminate acceptable circumstances that warrant abridging
students’ Fourth Amendment rights in the name of keeping schools safe. It will also
make clear when searches of students’ smartphones become unreasonable and vio-
lative of the Constitution. Second, this Comment suggests one policy schools should
adopt to best maintain school safety, curb threats, and protect students’ Fourth Amend-
ment rights with respect to their smartphones. These proposals taken together will
assist schools in addressing and curtailing smartphone-generated threats directed at
students, faculty, and administrators, while simultaneously reducing the number of
charges levied against juveniles in a post-Parkland America.
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INTRODUCTION
Nestled between Stonehill College, a private Catholic institution,7 and suburban
downtown Brockton, Massachusetts, population 100,000, Brockton High School
(BHS) rests in one of the Best Communities for Young People (2010, 2008, and
2005) and belongs to an award-winning public school system that has twice been
named one of America’s Best High Schools by U.S. News & World Report.8 Brockton
High School serves approximately 4,300 students in a purportedly “safe, supportive
environment that provides . . . the knowledge, skills, values and behaviors necessary
to become responsible and productive members of a diverse society.”9
Nearly 1,500 miles away, Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School sits some-
where between the Everglades and downtown Parkland, Florida, a woodsy satellite
of Boca Raton with approximately 25,000 residents.10 Marjory Stoneman Douglas High
School serves approximately 3,000 students11 with the aim of maintaining a “safe,
7 About Stonehill & Our Catholic Mission, STONEHILL, https://web.archive.org/web/208
0405001716/http://www.stonehill.edu/about-stonehill-our-mission/ [https://perma.cc/E6ZY
-MZ3F] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
8 About Brockton, CITY BROCKTON, MASS., https://web.archive.org/web/20181009130
904/www.brockton.ma.us/Community/AboutBrockton.aspx [https://perma.cc/YJG8-ESJS]
(last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
9 About Us, BROCKTON PUB. SCHS., https://www.bpsma.org/schools/brockton-high-school
/about-us [https://perma.cc/W3EF-VZQN] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
10 See About Us, PARKLAND, FLA., https://www.cityofparkland.org/59/About-Us [https://per
ma.cc/QCZ8-X55W] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020); Driving Directions from Brockton High School
to Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com [https://per
ma.cc/CAA6-YEEP] (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search starting point field for “Brock-
ton High School” and search destination field for “Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School”).
11 Vanessa Romo & Greg Allen, 1st Day of School at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High,
6 Months After Mass Shooting, NPR (Aug. 15, 2018, 9:51 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018
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secure, and engaging environment where students are encouraged to think critically
and communicate and collaborate effectively ensuring they are prepared for life after
high school.”12 In the 2018–2019 school year, the school pursued these goals from
thirty-four portable classrooms located adjacent to the old, sealed three-story building,
preserved by the State Attorney’s Office as evidence of the tragedy that occurred there
on February 14, 2018.13 Prior to that date, Brockton High School and Marjory
Stoneman Douglas High School would have seemed nearly indistinguishable.
But just five days into the 2018–2019 school year at Brockton High School, school
administrators, teachers, students, and parents had cause to fear that they would be the
next Parkland.14 The BHS administration received reports from several students that
they had observed a threat of gun violence posted on social media.15 The threat was
communicated via Snapchat, a popular messaging app for smartphones, and suggested
a gunman would target students during “fourth block.”16 Principal Clifford Murray
sprang into action, alerting parents in a robocall about the possible threat to their
children’s safety.17 BHS administrators assured parents that the faculty and adminis-
tration had taken “all the necessary precautions,” including requesting increased po-
lice presence on campus and arming each classroom with emergency kits: five-gallon
buckets containing a wooden doorstop, a hammer, a fifty-foot length of rope, and duct
tape.18 “It’s a sad comment on the times when someone can perpetrate something
like this and try to affect the school day of thousands of students,” Mr. Murray said
before reassuring parents that the school was prepared to carry on regular business.19
The Brockton High School administration’s resolve not to become the next
Stoneman Douglas was reflected in its swift response.20 Despite the school’s apparent
preparedness, however, it is difficult to imagine that Brockton administrators could
have anticipated that such a threat would originate nearly 1,000 miles away at Bruns-
wick High School in Brunswick, Georgia.21
Shortly after issuing the threatening message, which students shared and reshared
until it reached the suburban Boston’s “BHS” from south Georgia’s “BHS,” law
/08/15/639081757/1st-day-of-school-at-marjory-stoneman-douglas-high-6-months-after-mass
-shooting [https://n.pr/2MSYa1n].
12 Mission Statement, STONEMAN DOUGLAS HIGH SCH., https://www.browardschools.com
/Page/16940 [https://perma.cc/M8CA-QKHX] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
13 See Romo & Allen, supra note 11.
14 See Cody Shepard & Joe Pelletier, Brockton High School’s False Alarm Originated
in Georgia, Officials Say, WICKED LOC.: BROCKTON (Sept. 11, 2018, 9:39 AM), http://brock
ton.wickedlocal.com/news/20180911/brockton-high-schools-false-alarm-originated-in-geor
gia-officials-say [https://perma.cc/H2QB-2NRF].
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id.
19 Id.
20 See id.
21 See id.
2020] PREVENTING PARKLAND 1061
enforcement arrested a sixteen-year-old Brunswick High School student in connec-
tion with the scare.22 The student used the AirDrop function on an iPhone to send his
message instantaneously onward, and it was shared multiple times until it landed at
the wrong “BHS.”23 The message had drawn an immediate response from local,
state, and federal law enforcement officials in Georgia who quickly deemed the threat
“empty,”24 but the damage had already been done.25 In addition to the disturbance at
Brockton High School, Brunswick–area parents flocked to Brunswick High School en
masse to retrieve their children.26 Approximately thirty-six percent of students at
Brunswick High School were absent the following day.27 Law enforcement charged
the student with terroristic threats and disrupting a public school as a result of the
disorder his message wrought.28
In an era of instantaneous, smartphone-driven communication among students, how
was Brockton High School supposed to know the threat was a sham? How should
Brunswick High School have responded to identify the perpetrator of the threat?
Smartphones are pervasive fixtures in American schools and bring new challenges
to the classroom. According to a 2015 survey, the majority of elementary, middle, and
high school students use smartphones regularly.29 In fact, one look around a law school
classroom while the professor has her head down—perhaps making use of her own
smartphone—demonstrates that this phenomenon carries into professional school, too.30
This subject has led some to dub smartphones in school “the most vexing issue of
the digital age for teachers and administrators.”31
And the issue expands far beyond a lack of student attention in the classroom
to the ability to perpetrate serious and disruptive crimes locally or some distance away,
22 See id.
23 See Shepard & Pelletier, supra note 14; see also Larry Hobbs, Police Presence Up, Attend-
ance Down at BHS Tuesday, BRUNSWICK NEWS (Sept. 12, 2018), https://thebrunswicknews.com
/news/local_news/police-presence-up-attendance-down-at-bhs-tuesday/article_b7093d8e
-1355-5d7d-b0ee-39b2354c3c84.html [https://perma.cc/MF34-HQWS] (explaining how the mes-
sage was also misinterpreted as a threat against Bowmanville High School in Ontario, Canada).
24 See Shepard & Pelletier, supra note 14.
25 See id.
26 See Hobbs, supra note 23.
27 Id.
28 See Shepard & Pelletier, supra note 14.
29 Harris Poll, Pearson Student Mobile Device Survey 2015: National Report: Students
in Grades 4–12, PEARSON, https://www.pearsoned.com/wp-content/uploads/2015-Pearson-Stu
dent-Mobile-Device-Survey-Grades-4-12.pdf [https://perma.cc/RJ6W-P8GB].
30 This proposition is based on personal anecdotal experience at Emory University School
of Law, a “top-ranked law school” with a “rigorous curriculum attuned to the needs of the
legal profession.” About Emory Law, EMORY U. SCH. L., http://law.emory.edu/about/index.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/9QE7-KZRU] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
31 Linda Matchan, Schools Seek Balance for Cellphones in Class: Are They a Teaching
Tool or a Distraction?, BOS. GLOBE (June 16, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle
/style/2015/06/15/cellphones-school-teaching-tool-distraction/OzHjXyL7VVIXV1AEke
YtiJ/story.html [https://perma.cc/3EUG-XE39].
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as in the BHS example, in which case charges may be warranted. Recent data demon-
strate that teens almost always have smartphone access, regardless of income level,32
and data show threats against schools are delivered most often through social media.33
Meanwhile, following the Parkland shooting and amid a flood of “copycat” threats,
tips, and false alarms, school and law enforcement officials across the country have
resorted to charging students more frequently with terroristic threats.34 The increase
in smartphone use coupled with the uptick in terroristic threats charges being levied
for threats made via social media beg a closer look at how to balance school safety
concerns with students’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights.
This Comment argues that the United States Supreme Court should articulate
a more appropriate standard for searching juveniles’ smartphones in the school con-
text, which this Comment calls “reasonable suspicion-plus.”35 This proposal will
resolve an important discrepancy between two landmark Supreme Court cases, New
Jersey v. T.L.O.36 and Riley v. California,37 that bear on a modern reality—that students
carry smartphones38—and require reconciliation. Recognizing that protecting schools
is an important interest, this Comment recommends that the scope of searches be
tailored to the particularity with which school officials allege a violation of school
policy, and that school officials memorialize the reason for and scope of their search
in order to prevent unreasonable violations of Students’ Fourth Amendment rights.39
It also endorses treating school resource officers like law enforcement for the pur-
poses of searching students’ smartphones and argues that school officials should
likewise require probable cause to search students’ phones when acting in concert
with law enforcement.40 Finally, this Comment promotes one focused, research-based
policy that can help curb threats and eliminate charges.41
Part I of this Comment shows the upsurge in terroristic threats charges levied
against juveniles across the country in the wake of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas
High School shooting in Parkland, Florida.42 In addition to identifying and defining
32 See Monica Anderson & Jingjing Jiang, Teens, Social Media & Technology 2018, PEW
RES. CTR. (May 31, 2018), http://www.pewinternet.org/2018/05/31/teens-social-media-tech
nology-2018/ [https://perma.cc/7VEW-5W83].
33 Amy Klinger & Amanda Klinger, Violent Threats and Incidents in Schools: An Analysis
of the 2017–2018 School Year, EDUCATOR’S SCH. SAFETY NETWORK, https://static1.square
space.com/static/55674542e4b074aad07152ba/t/5b685da703ce64d6290738f5/15335664048
51/www.eSchoolSafety.org_Violent+threats+and+incidents+in+schools+report+2017-2018
.pdf [https://perma.cc/EQL8-XH7L] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
34 See Bosman, supra note 6.
35 See infra notes 357–58 and accompanying text.
36 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
37 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
38 See infra Part II.
39 See infra Conclusion.
40 See infra Conclusion.
41 See infra Conclusion.
42 See infra Part I.
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this trend, it discusses the tenuous nature of the relationship between students and
school administrators, the increased referral of student misbehavior by school officials
to law enforcement, the unique role of school resource officers in school discipline,
and an explanation of how these issues contribute to the school-to-prison pipeline,
including information about the long-term effects of incarceration on juveniles.43
After pinpointing this issue, Part II discusses the ubiquitous nature of cell phones
and their role in students’ lives, the classroom, and school discipline. This Part pays
special attention to smartphones’ many functions and their implications.44 In addi-
tion, this Part highlights how smartphones have affected school discipline, feeding
the school-to-prison pipeline.45
Part III lays out the history of the Fourth Amendment and juveniles’ privacy rights
in the school context, focusing on the evolution of the Fourth Amendment, the cur-
rent state of school search jurisprudence, and how the Fourth Amendment applies to
smartphones.46 It also highlights issues that exist at the intersection of the Fourth
Amendment, cell phones, and schools, and are ripe for Supreme Court consideration.47
Finally, Part IV shows how the Supreme Court has lapsed in articulating a work-
able, modern standard for searching students’ phones at school.48 In doing so, it argues
that violations of students’ Fourth Amendment privacy rights go unchecked.49 Because
smartphones are so prevalent, and because they have changed the landscape of school
discipline, this Part suggests a new standard, “reasonable suspicion-plus,” whereby
school officials would document their reasoning and scope if they decide to search a
student’s smartphone.50 This new standard, as well as a clear delineation between
school officials and law enforcement for Fourth Amendment purposes, would work
to serve the competing interests of school safety and order, and student privacy.51 In
addition, this Part offers one policy recommendation that school administrators could
implement to protect their students and their students’ rights.52
I. THREATS IN SCHOOLS POST-PARKLAND: THE PROBLEM, RESPONSE, AND RESULTS
Since the April 20, 1999, Columbine shooting, and with renewed dynamism fol-
lowing the December 14, 2012, tragedy at Sandy Hook Elementary School in
Newtown, Connecticut, many Americans have called for increased safety measures
at schools,53 including the presence of armed law enforcement officers in our
43 See infra Part I.
44 See infra Part II.
45 See infra Part II.
46 See infra Part III.
47 See infra Part III.
48 See infra Part IV.
49 See infra Part IV.
50 See infra Part IV.
51 See infra Part IV.
52 See infra Part IV.
53 See, e.g., David Nakamura & Tom Hamburger, Put Armed Police in Every School,
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schools.54 Recent studies demonstrate that police presence in schools has increased
since 2000, just after Columbine, corresponding with escalations in U.S. Department
of Justice funding in the same period of time.55 Despite criticism from some groups
that increased police presence is an ineffective school safety measure,56 the federal
government and several state assemblies authorized legislation aimed at hiring law
enforcement officers, installing greater security measures in schools, and improving
school safety,57 the effects of which are borne out in the below data.
Increased police presence in schools is not resulting in fewer charges against
juveniles; rather, schools are increasingly relying on law enforcement to maintain
order.58 School administrators routinely refer students to law enforcement for mis-
conduct that occurs at school, resulting in a growing number of juveniles having
brushes with the criminal justice system and juvenile courts.59 In particular, school
NRA Urges, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/put
-armed-police-officers-in-every-school-nra-head-says/2012/12/21/9ac7d4ae-4b8b-11e2-9a
42-d1ce6d0ed278_story.html [https://perma.cc/88Q3-PTXJ] (noting that Wayne LaPierre,
Executive Vice President and CEO of the National Rifle Association, has proposed putting
an armed police officer in every school in the country as a way to prevent mass shootings).
54 See infra Part IV; see also Jason P. Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison
Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 919, 926 (2016) (“In response to [the Sandy Hook Elementary
School] tragedy, many Americans demanded that lawmakers and school officials intensify
school security measures and increase the presence of law enforcement officers in our na-
tion’s schools.”).
55 See Chongmin Na & Denise C. Gottfredson, Police Officers in Schools: Effects on
School Crime and the Processing of Offending Behaviors, 30 JUST. Q. 619, 644 (2013).
56 See, e.g., Michael Hansen, There Are Ways to Make Schools Safer and Teachers
Stronger—but They Don’t Involve Guns, BROOKINGS (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.brookings
.edu/blog/brown-center-chalkboard/2018/02/27/there-are-ways-to-make-schools-safer-and
-teachers-stronger-but-they-dont-involve-guns/ [https://perma.cc/9F2R-N7HG]; see also Radley
Balko, Putting More Cops in Schools Won’t Make Schools Safer, and It Will Likely Inflict a Lot
of Harm, WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018, 4:49 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the
-watch/wp/2018/02/22/putting-more-cops-in-schools-wont-make-schools-safer-and-it-will
-likely-inflict-a-lot-of-harm/?utm_term=.26b4bef3ac1 [https://perma.cc/E7HK-9GLU]; Rebecca
Klein, Why School Cops Won’t Fix School Shootings, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 16, 2018, 4:51
PM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/school-cops-shootings_us_5a8715c8e4b05c2bcaca
7c29 [https://perma.cc/CK4F-MJ8U]; Dara Lind, Why Having Police in Schools Is a Problem,
in 3 Charts, VOX (Oct. 28, 2015, 12:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/2015/10/28/9626820/police
-school-resource-officers [https://perma.cc/D62A-4DKG]; More Police—In Schools and Out—
Not the Answer, JUST. POL’Y INST. (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.justicepolicy.org/news/4829
[https://perma.cc/E8VH-9A2J].
57 See Nance, supra note 54, at 947–48.
58 See Catherine Y. Kim, Policing School Discipline, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 861, 864 (2012).
59 See id. at 862 (citing Ben Brown, Understanding and Assessing School Police Officers:
A Conceptual and Methodological Comment, 34 J. CRIM. JUST. 591, 599 (2006)) (discussing
emerging prevalence of police officers in schools); see also Philip J. Cook et al., School
Crime Control and Prevention, in 39 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 313, 314
(Michael Tonry ed., 2010) (observing “greater recourse to arrest and the juvenile courts
rather than school-based discipline”); Michael P. Krezmien et al., Juvenile Court Referrals
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administrators are referring students accused of making threats against teachers,
administration, or other students to law enforcement at new rates.60 The sheer volume
of juveniles being referred to law enforcement by school officials calls into question
zero-tolerance policies.61 Now, in a post-Parkland world, this discussion is gaining
new traction and renewed attention across the country.
This Part frames the gravity of post-Parkland terroristic threats charges against
juveniles, focusing on extreme examples in order to highlight the absurd range of re-
sults accruing under the present legal regime. In addition, it discusses the tenuous nature
of the relationship between students and school administrators and the increased report-
ing of student behavior by school officials to law enforcement, paying special attention
to the unique role of school resource officers in school discipline. It also includes
an overview of relevant information about the school-to-prison pipeline, which con-
textualizes the severity of the problem and demonstrates the need to address it.
A. The Problem: The Post-Parkland Escalation of Threats and Charges Against
Juveniles
Since the Parkland shooting in February 2018, school administrators are turning
over students who allegedly threaten to commit violent acts at school to law enforce-
ment at escalating rates.62 According to a Wall Street Journal review of school
district discipline reports, police arrests, and other news stories, approximately 350
and the Public Schools: Nature and Extent of the Practice in Five States, 26 J. CONTEMP.
CRIM. JUST. 273, 275 (2010) (examining data on rising incidence of school-based arrest);
Matthew T. Theriot, School Resource Officers and the Criminalization of Student Behavior,
37 J. CRIM. JUST. 280, 280, 286 (2009) (analyzing role of police officers in schools).
60 See Hobbs, supra note 4 (discussing how approximately 350 students were charged
with making threats in the U.S. in the two months following the Parkland shootings).
61 Susan Ferris, How Does Your State Rank on Sending Students to Police?, TIME (Apr. 10,
2015), http://time.com/3818075/student-police-ranking/ [https://perma.cc/SCW4-96CD] (de-
scribing how statistics show, an average, six out of every thousand children nationwide are
referred to a law enforcement agency—some states, like Virginia at sixteen per thousand,
nearly tripled the national average).
62 See, e.g., Joe Henke, What Can Happen to Students Who Post School Shooting Threats?,
11ALIVE (Feb. 26, 2018, 5:46 PM), https://www.11alive.com/article/news/local/what-can-hap
pen-to-students-who-post-school-shooting-threats/85-523534167 [https://perma.cc/U56D-C7QF]
(noting that twelve days after Parkland, at least twenty-seven Atlanta-area threats resulted
in twenty arrests and Cobb County District Attorney Vic Reynolds “let [his] juvenile prosecutors
know they take these charges extremely serious and they’re going to pursue them as aggressively
as they can”); Lily Jackson, At Least 46 Alabama Students Disciplined for Making Threats Since
Parkland, AL.COM (July 7, 2018), https://www.al.com/news/index.ssf/2018/07/approximately
_46_school_terror.html [https://perma.cc/R65H-3TJ5]; Claire McInerny, Number of Texas Stu-
dents Accused of Making ‘Terroristic Threats’ Tripled After Parkland, KUT (July 24, 2018),
http://www.kut.org/post/number-texas-students-accused-making-terroristic-threats-tripled
-after-parkland [https://perma.cc/Z3B5-8JSP] (“The number of students in Texas accused of
making terroristic threats or exhibiting a firearm increased significantly in the first five months
of 2018 compared with last year.”).
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students were detained for threatening behavior directed toward faculty, administration,
or other students between the February 14, 2018, Parkland tragedy and April 22,
2018.63 The charges ranged from misdemeanors to felonies, with many schools opting
to expel students in addition to referring them to the police for their alleged threats.64
The anecdotal evidence and data show that school threats are on the rise and many
occur via social media, creating a new challenge for schools and law enforcement.
In some instances, school and law enforcement action thwarted potential vio-
lence.65 While patrolling the hallways, a Los Angeles County high school security
officer overheard a student discussing an attack just two days after the Parkland shoot-
ing.66 Law enforcement officers detained the student, obtained a warrant to search
his home, and uncovered two AR-15 rifles, two handguns, and roughly ninety rifle
magazines that could hold as many as thirty rounds per magazine.67 At least one rifle
was unregistered.68 In taking the threat seriously, detaining the student, and obtain-
ing a search warrant, school officials at El Camino High School possibly avoided
what could have been a major tragedy.
In other cases, law enforcement involvement at school resulted in obtuse, hard-to-
justify actions against juveniles.69 Four days after the threat in Los Angeles County,
police in Oakdale, Louisiana, detained a twelve-year-old girl overnight after she alleg-
edly spoke to other students about a threat against her school, which she claimed to
have received on social media.70 School administrators interviewed the girl and deter-
mined she never received such a threat.71 Even so, they turned over control of the inci-
dent to Oakdale area police, who charged the sixth grader with felony “terrorizing.”72
Law enforcement officials have arrested several students in the wake of Parkland
in connection with threats posted via social media apps like Twitter and Snapchat.73
In Orono, Minnesota, a student posted on Twitter: “Orono is not safe. Today at 12:00
p.m. I will shoot up the school myself.”74 In South Carolina, a high school student
posted a photo of himself on Snapchat wearing a mask and holding an assault rifle
63 Hobbs, supra note 4.
64 See id.
65 See, e.g., Alex Horton, A Safety Officer Overheard a Threat. Police Say That May
Have Helped Thwart a School Shooting., WASH. POST (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.washing
tonpost.com/news/education/wp/2018/02/21/school-shooting-thwarted-thanks-to-a-security
-guards-tip-police-say/?utm_term=.001813c3a021 [https://perma.cc/MG6Z-YM9A] (describing
how one security officer overheard a potential threat and questioned a student who was later
found to be in possession of multiple firearms).
66 See id.
67 See id.
68 See id.
69 See, e.g., Hobbs, supra note 4.
70 See id.
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 See Bosman, supra note 6.
74 Id.
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with the caption “Round 2 of Florida tomorrow.”75 In Fall River, Massachusetts, a
student posted on Snapchat that there would be a “Florida Pt. 2” at his high school.76
Many other instances of threats against schools on Facebook, Snapchat, and Instagram
led to student arrests in the days immediately following the Parkland shooting, includ-
ing several in Texas and Florida, and incidents in Bullitt County and Nicholasville,
Kentucky; Norfolk, Virginia; Abbeville, South Carolina; Nutley, New Jersey; and
elsewhere across the country.77
Demonstrable data ground the anecdotal evidence, too. In the week following
the Parkland shooting, schools across the country reported at least fifty threats or vio-
lent incidents each day, five times as many threats as are usually reported per day
including fraudulent threats and false alarms.78 In the week after the shooting, Kentucky
saw twenty-four threats, Ohio had twenty-nine incidents, and Florida experienced
more threats of school violence than any other state, with thirty-one incidents of
threatened violence.79
School safety experts from the Educator’s School Safety Network pointed to the
national conversation surrounding and the media coverage of the Parkland shooting
as a potential causal factor of the upsurge in school-based threats post-Parkland.80
Researchers with the Network found that threats of violence and actual violence at
schools are both on the rise at alarming rates.81 For instance, according to the Network
there were about 3,380 threats recorded in the 2017–2018 school year, jumping up
62% from the 2,085 threats in the 2016–2017 school year.82 The data indicate that
75 Horton, supra note 65.
76 Alex Newman, Durfee High Increases Security After ‘Florida Pt. 2’ Threat, PATCH
(Feb. 16, 2018, 8:33 AM), https://patch.com/massachusetts/seekonk-swansea/durfee-high-in
creases-security-after-florida-pt-2-threat [https://perma.cc/V352-R75T].
77 See CNN, Threats to Schools Mount Since Parkland Shooting, ABC ACTION NEWS
(Feb. 20, 2018, 6:31 AM), https://www.abcactionnews.com/news/national/threats-to-schools
-mount-since-parkland-shooting [https://perma.cc/5SE9-GUJL].
78 See Bosman, supra note 6.
79 See id.
80 See Klinger & Klinger, supra note 33, at 9–10.
81 See id. at 3, 6, 14 (“For the purposes of this research, ‘violent incidents’ and ‘threats
of violence’ are defined as those with the potential for loss of life, such as explosive devices,
firearms, and other potentially lethal devices such as knives etc. Lower levels of school
violence, such as fights, harassment etc. are not included.”).
82 See id. at 1; see also STATES OF CONCERN: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. STATES WITH HIGH
RATES OF SCHOOL-BASED VIOLENT THREATS AND INCIDENTS 2017–2018 SCHOOL YEAR
EDITION, EDUCATOR’S SCH. SAFETY NETWORK, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/55674
542e4b074aad07152ba/t/5b7ae94a562fa7c4f8ed200c/1534781776199/States+of+Concern+An
+Analysis+of+U.S.+States+with+High+Rates+of+School-Based+Violent+Threats+and+Inci
dents.+17-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/54GZ-C2GE] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) (“In the 2017–2018
school year, the 11 states of most concern accounted for 36% of all threats and 42% of all
incidents, despite accounting for only 28% of the U.S. population.”); Overview and Summary,
EDUCATOR’S SCH. SAFETY NETWORK, http://eschoolsafety.org/concern [https://perma.cc/J9GG
-MSBL] (“The states of greatest concern based on data from the 2017–2018 school year are
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38.8% of threats in the 2017–2018 school year were shooting threats, 22.5% were
bomb threats, and the remainder were nonspecific threats of violence or threats of
a combination of multiple forms of violence.83 But these data also demonstrate the
significance of Parkland as a data point. The data show that “1,494 more threats oc-
curred in the spring of 2018 than the fall of 2017, resulting in an increase of 159%”
in the second semester.84 More specifically, 43 % of all threats recorded in the study
occurred in the thirty days immediately following Parkland.85 Most alarmingly, the
data show that 279 realized incidents of violence happened in the 2017–2018 school
year, an increase of 113% over the 131 actual instances of violence in the 2016–2017
school year.86 27 % of school-based violent incidents occurred in the thirty days im-
mediately following Parkland.87 Exact data is difficult to ascertain, given that many
threats and instances of violence go unreported.88 Researchers argue, though, that
while Parkland may not be the sole “catalyst” for the rise of threats and violence, the
figures are, at least, “a horrific example of the overall increase in violence . . . during
the 2017–2018 school year.”89
Though difficult to measure, data suggest that Parkland is likelier the product
of school violence than the reverse. One thing appears to be certain, however: with
the rise in threats and violent incidents at schools in the wake of Parkland, school
officials and police are taking all reports seriously.90 The result is that more juveniles
are being referred to law enforcement for terroristic threats than in previous years.91
B. The Response: Increased School-Law Enforcement Coalescence and the
Emergence of the SRO
In addition to increases in reported threats and violent incidents in schools, school
officials and law enforcement are cooperating at previously unseen levels, leading
to an increased presence of law enforcement officers in school buildings across the
Michigan, Ohio, Alabama, Kentucky, Washington, Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Florida, North
Carolina, Colorado, and Idaho.”).
83 See Klinger & Klinger, supra note 33, at 4 (“This is a slight change from the 2016–
2017 school year when bomb threats were the most common (34.6%), followed by shooting
threats (30%) and unspecified threats (26%).”).
84 See id.
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See Bosman, supra note 6.
91 See Deborah Fowler & Morgan Craven, Collateral Consequences: The Increase in
Texas Student Arrests Following the Parkland and Santa Fe Tragedies, TEX. APPLESEED
(July 11, 2018), http://stories.texasappleseed.org/collateral-consequences [https://perma.cc
/EZ6D-9PQA] (explaining that “referrals to Texas juvenile probation departments in the wake
of the Parkland tragedy” increased dramatically, at a rate of 156% for terroristic threats).
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country.92 Tragic, but well-known and highly publicized instances of violence at
American schools, including the shootings at high schools in Columbine,93 Parkland,94
and most recently Santa Fe,95 appear to be driving measures to increase law enforce-
ment presence in schools.96 But while police are more involved in searches of stu-
dents and their property, including students’ smartphones,97 and are more likely to be
involved in subsequent discipline,98 they are not the only law enforcement personnel
in American schoolhouses. As a result of these salient tragedies, school resource of-
ficers have emerged as a commonplace feature of the American public-school system,
giving rise to questions about their efficacy and legal status.
School resource officers (SROs)99 are rapidly becoming a fixture in many
schools,100 making their role one of central importance for juvenile students’ Fourth
Amendment rights. There are two federal statutory definitions for SROs, which shed
light on the expected role of SROs in schools. First, the Community Oriented Policing
Services (COPS) authorization measure focuses on the SRO’s role in community
policing and suggests that SROs should fill a more traditional law enforcement role.101
92 See Nance, supra note 54, at 926; Kristi North, Recess Is Over: Granting Miranda
Rights to Students Interrogated Inside School Walls, 62 EMORY L.J. 441, 469 (2012); see also
Michael Pinard, From the Classroom to the Courtroom: Reassessing Fourth Amendment
Standards in Public School Searches Involving Law Enforcement Authorities, 45 ARIZ. L.
REV. 1067, 1077–78 (2003).
93 See Columbine High School Shootings Fast Facts, CNN (Aug. 23, 2019, 8:33 PM), https://
www.cnn.com/2013/09/18/us/columbine-high-school-shootings-fast-facts/index.html [https://
cnn.it/1Hkfvsu] (stating that twelve students and one teacher were killed by two students).
94 See Jonathan Sperling, Florida School Shooting: These Are the 17 Victims, NBC NEWS
(Feb. 16, 2018, 4:26 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/florida-school-shooting
-these-are-17-victims-n848706 [https://perma.cc/P4SA-9P4N] (stating fourteen students and
three faculty members were killed by one student).
95 See Manny Fernandez et al., In Texas School Shooting, 10 Dead, 10 Hurt and Many
Unsurprised, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/18/us/school
-shooting-santa-fe-texas.html [https://perma.cc/PBA3-JCSF] (stating there were ten fatalities—
eight students and two teachers were killed by one student).
96 See Pinard, supra note 92, at 1067.
97 See discussion infra Sections II.B, III.D, IV.A.
98 See Developments in the Law: Policing, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1706, 1755 (2015).
99 See Frequently Asked Questions: General FAQs, NASRO, https://nasro.org/faq/ [https://
perma.cc/SW7E-TEZL] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) [hereinafter NASRO] (“A school resource
officer, by federal definition, is a career law enforcement officer with sworn authority who
is deployed by an employing police department . . . to work in collaboration with one or more
schools. NASRO recommends that . . . officers receive[] at least 40 hours of specialized
training in school policing before being assigned.”).
100 See Kerrin C. Wolf, Assessing Students’ Civil Rights Claims Against School Resource
Officers, 38 PACE L. REV. 215, 225 (2018).
101 See 34 U.S.C. § 10389 (2017) (formerly cited as 42 U.S.C.A. § 3796dd-8); see also
NATHAN JAMES & GAIL MCCALLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43126, SCHOOL RESOURCE
OFFICERS: LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS IN SCHOOLS 21 (2013); LEADERSHIP FOR EDUCA-
TIONAL EQUITY, EMERGING MODELS FOR POLICE PRESENCE IN SCHOOLS, https://educational
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Meanwhile, the Safe Drug Free Schools and Communities Act suggests SROs should
focus on educating students about crime and safety,102 which is consistent with the
legislation’s purpose.103 Both definitions firmly establish SROs as law enforcement
officers.104
Even so, it is challenging to understand the function of SROs in schools, as they
often straddle the line between law enforcement and school official. SROs are reg-
ularly assigned to one or several schools pursuant to agreements between the local
police and the school district.105 And SROs can be expected to play any of three parts:
law enforcement, counselor, or educator.106 On the one hand, SROs are “expected
to form meaningful relationships with students to help guide them away from de-
linquency and towards success in school”; on the other hand, SROs can assist in
“arresting misbehaving students for alleged violations of criminal law.”107 The close
relationship between schools and police departments, manifesting in the form of the
equity.org/sites/default/files/documents/emerging_models_for_school_resource_officers
_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7AWG-PC9N] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) [hereinafter EMERGING
MODELS]. An SRO is
a career law enforcement officer, with sworn authority, deployed in
community-oriented policing, and assigned by the employing police de-
partment or agency to work in collaboration with schools and community-
based organizations—(A) to address crime and disorder problems, gangs,
and drug activities affecting or occurring in or around an elementary or
secondary school; (B) to develop or expand crime prevention efforts for
students; (C) to educate likely school-age victims in crime prevention and
safety; (D) to develop or expand community justice initiatives for
students; (E) to train students in conflict resolution, restorative justice,
and crime awareness; (F) to assist in the identification of physical
changes in the environment that may reduce crime in or around the
school; and (G) to assist in developing school policy that addresses
crime and to recommend procedural changes.
34 U.S.C. § 10389.
102 An SRO is
a career law enforcement officer, with sworn authority, deployed in
community oriented policing, and assigned by the employing police
department to a local educational agency to work in collaboration with
schools and community based organizations to—(A) educate students
in crime and illegal drug use prevention and safety; (B) develop or
expand community justice initiatives for students; and (C) train stu-
dents in conflict resolution, restorative justice, and crime and illegal
drug use awareness.
20 U.S.C. § 7161 (2012) (repealed 2015).
103 See id. § 7171; see also JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 101, at 21; EMERGING MODELS,
supra note 101.
104 See 34 U.S.C. § 10389; 20 U.S.C. § 7161.
105 See Wolf, supra note 100, at 221.
106 See id. at 220.
107 See id. at 221.
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SRO, creates confusion among students whom SROs might mentor one day and
arrest the next.108 Courts are likewise puzzled when it comes to spelling out the legal
status of SROs.109
The emergence of the SRO can be traced back to the 1990s.110 Since that time,
there has been a “massive increase in the police and security presence in schools,”111
but it is hard to tell how many SROs are operating in schools across the country.112
The U.S. Department of Justice sought once to count the number of SROs and found
that there were more than 17,000 SROs deployed in public schools nationwide.113
The National Association of School Resource Officers estimates there are between
14,000 and 20,000 SROs currently working in public schools across the country.114
A 2018 survey by the National Center for Education Statistics, a subagency of United
States Department of Education, noted that 42% of public schools reported that they
had at least one SRO present at least one day a week.115 However, because many
SROs serve more than one school and some schools have more than one SRO, it is
difficult to “reliably extrapolate the number of SROs from the percentage of schools”
in the survey data.116
Despite the proliferation of SROs in American schools, it is difficult to ascertain
whether SROs are effective at promoting school safety.117 The Congressional Re-
search Service summarized the available research on the effectiveness of SROs:
Studies of SRO effectiveness that have measured actual safety
outcomes have mixed results, some show an improvement in
safety and a reduction in crime; others show no change. Typically,
studies that report positive results from SRO programs rely on
participants’ perceptions of the effectiveness of the program rather
than on objective evidence. Other studies fail to isolate incidents
108 See id. at 224.
109 See Pinard, supra note 92, at 1081–82; see also discussion infra Section III.D.
110 See EMERGING MODELS, supra note 101.
111 ADVANCEMENT PROJECT, TEST, PUNISH, AND PUSH OUT: HOW “ZERO TOLERANCE” AND
HIGH-STAKES TESTING FUNNEL YOUTH INTO THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 10 (2010),
https://b.3cdn.net/advancement/d05cb2181a4545db07_r2im6caqe.pdf [https://perma.cc/X4
UX-ANGP].
112 See NASRO, supra note 99.
113 See id. (noting DOJ has not repeated the data collection since 2007).
114 This information is based on DOJ data and the number of SROs that NASRO has
trained. See id.
115 See Lauren Musu-Gillett et al., Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2017, U.S.
DEP’T EDUC. (Mar. 29, 2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018036.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VX32-CD8C].
116 See NASRO, supra note 99.
117 See JAMES & MCCALLION, supra note 101, at 10 (“Despite the popularity of SRO
programs, there are few available studies that have reliably evaluated their effectiveness.”).
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of crime and violence, so it is impossible to know whether the
positive results stem from the presence of SROs or are the re-
sults of other factors.118
A 2011 study suggests, however, that the percentage of reports of crimes involving
“non-serious violent offenses” increased as schools increased their use of law en-
forcement in schools.119 In particular, schools that employed SROs demonstrated “a
12.3% higher percentage of reporting non-serious violent crime to law enforcement
than those that did not add SROs.”120 Schools with SROs also showed a higher number
of disorderly conduct incidences than did schools without SROs.121 So, while the
data are not conclusive, SROs may be contributing to the criminalization of school
misbehavior.122
While increased law enforcement presence in school seems like a wise strategy
for curbing student misbehavior, it can lead to negative results. Michael Pinard, pro-
fessor of criminal law and procedure and Co-Director of the Clinical Law Program at
the Maryland Francis King Cary School of Law, highlights four effects of the increased
presence of law enforcement in schools.123 First, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence
“has undervalued the manner and extent to which law enforcement personnel are
involved in student searches.”124 Second, the increased presence of law enforcement
has contributed to the increased use of the juvenile and criminal justice systems to
handle problems that would otherwise be adjudicated through school disciplinary
processes.125 Whereas schools used to resolve more minor indiscretions internally,
they increasingly outsource this task.126 Third, many courts tend to interchange law
enforcement officers and school officials when analyzing Fourth Amendment claims
arising from searches they conduct on public school grounds.127 This leads to jurisdic-
tional splits in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, a lack of clarity for both students
and schools, and an inconsistent application of the Fourth Amendment’s probable
cause requirement to law enforcement (including SROs).128 Finally, the trend of zero
tolerance policies in schools compounded by the presence of law enforcement at
118 See id. at 9 (internal citations omitted).
119 See Na & Gottfredson, supra note 55, at 619.
120 See id. at 640. While it is difficult to ascertain whether this increase in reporting led
to more criminal convictions, it logically fostered more connections between the juveniles
involved and the criminal justice system. This is problematic for a host of reasons, only a few
of which this Comment discusses. See discussion infra Section I.C.
121 Theriot, supra note 59, at 285.
122 See discussion infra Section I.C; see also EMERGING MODELS, supra note 101.
123 See Pinard, supra note 92, at 1069.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 See id. at 1102.
127 See id. at 1069; see also infra Section III.D.
128 See discussion infra Section III.D.
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schools has amplified the “criminalization of youth behavior.”129 Simply put, this
means more children are subject to more points of contact with the criminal justice
system and, therefore, more chances to be affected by it. These results, together, feed
the school-to-prison pipeline.
C. The Results: The School-to-Prison Pipeline
Evidence also suggests that as law enforcement officers, particularly SROs,
become more omnipresent in schools, more students are subjected to the school-to-
prison pipeline.130 The school-to-prison pipeline refers to “the practice of funneling
students currently enrolled in school to the juvenile justice system or removing
students from school temporarily or permanently, thereby creating conditions under
which the students are more likely to end up in prison.”131 Experts have studied and
recorded the negative consequences of the school-to-prison pipeline for students, in-
cluding diminished classroom instruction due to suspension or expulsion, demonstrated
difficulty with coursework, higher dropout rates, and more.132 More specifically, Udi
Ofer, Director of the Campaign for Smart Justice at the American Civil Liberties
Union, warns, “Children who are removed from the learning environment, even for
a few days, are more likely to drop out, use drugs, face emotional challenges, become
involved with the juvenile justice system, and develop criminal records as adults.”133
The National Association of School Resource Officers maintains that wide-
spread utilization of SROs does not contribute to the school-to-prison pipeline.134
129 See Pinard, supra note 92, at 1069.
130 See EMERGING MODELS, supra note 101; see also Theriot, supra note 59, at 286–87.
131 See Jason P. Nance, School Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, 2014 WIS. L.
REV. 79, 83 (2014); see also ADVANCEMENT PROJECT ET AL., FEDERAL POLICY, ESEA
REAUTHORIZATION, AND THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 2 (2011), http://b.3cdn.net/ad
vancement/ceb35d4874b0ffde10_ubm6baeap.pdf [https://perma.cc/X66J-4YZC]; Case: School
to Prison Pipeline, NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND (Feb. 16, 2018), http://www.naacpldf
.org/case/school-prison-pipeline [https://perma.cc/24J3-8AGE].
132 See Hawker v. Sandy City Corp., 774 F.3d 1243, 1245 (10th Cir. 2014) (taking judicial
notice of this trend).
133 Udi Ofer, Criminalizing the Classroom: The Rise of Aggressive Policing and Zero
Tolerance Discipline in New York City Public Schools, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1373, 1401
(2011–12).
134 Do school resource officers contribute to a school-to-prison pipeline?
No. Carefully selected, specially trained school resource officers who
follow NASRO’s best practices do not arrest students for disciplinary
issues that would be handled by teachers and/or administrators if the
SROs were not there. On the contrary, SROs help troubled students
avoid involvement with the juvenile justice system. In fact, wide accept-
ance of NASRO best practices is one reason that the rates of juvenile
arrests throughout the U.S. fell during a period when the proliferation
of SROs increased.
NASRO, supra note 99; see also MAURICE CANADY ET AL., TO PROTECT & EDUCATE: THE
SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER AND THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE IN SCHOOLS, NASRO7
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But scholars maintain that SROs and law enforcement officers are compounding the
issue. One such scholar, Jason P. Nance, Associate Director for Education Law and
Policy at the Center on Children and Families and Professor of Law at the Univer-
sity of Florida Levin College of Law, argues that “strict security measures in and of
themselves can harm the educational climate by alienating students and generating
mistrust, which, paradoxically, may lead to even more disorder and violence.”135 The
number of students suspended or expelled in secondary schools nationwide for
trivial infractions of school rules or offenses increased from one in thirteen for 1972
to 1973 to one in nine for 2009 to 2010,136 and school-based referrals to law enforce-
ment have increased.137 When students are found delinquent or convicted of crimes,
schools sometimes refuse to readmit them; or, if readmitted, students face stigma
and increased monitoring by school officials and SROs.138 Evidence suggests that
“incarcerating juveniles limits their future educational, housing, employment, and
military opportunities[,] . . . negatively affects a youth’s mental health, reinforces
violent attitudes and behavior, and increases the odds of future involvement in the
justice system.”139 In addition to these ramifications and their disproportionate
impact on minority juvenile students,140 the economic costs of incarcerating juvenile
students are likewise overwhelming.141
(2012), https://nasro.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/NASRO-To-Protect-and-Educate
-nosecurity.pdf.
135 See Nance, supra note 54, at 948–49.
136 See id. at 952–53.
137 See id. at 953–54 (“For example, in North Carolina, the number of school-based re-
ferrals increased by 10 percent from 2008 to 2013. In an empirical study to compare referrals
across multiple states, researchers Michael Krezmien, Peter Leone, Mark Zablocki, and Craig
Wells found that in four of the five states studied (Arizona, Hawaii, Missouri, and West
Virginia), referrals from schools comprised a larger proportion of total referrals to the juvenile
justice system in 2004 than in 1995. That study also demonstrated that schools in Missouri,
Hawaii, and Arizona referred greater proportions of their students in 2004 than in 1995. The
number of school-based arrests also increased in the Philadelphia Public School District
(from 1,632 in 1999–2000 to 2,194 in 2002–2003); Houston Independent School District
(from 1,063 in 2001 to 4,002 in 2002); Clayton County, Georgia (from 89 in the 1990s to
1,400 in 2004); Miami-Dade County, Florida (a threefold increase from 1999 to 2001, and
from 1,816 in 2001 to 2,566 in 2004); and Lucas County, Ohio (from 1,237 in 2000 to 1,727
in 2002). Similar to the increase of suspensions and expulsions, there is substantial evidence
that the vast majority of these school-based referrals were for relatively minor offenses.”).
138 See id. at 955 (noting that an arrest or court appearance increases the likelihood that
students will drop out of school).
139 See id. at 954.
140 See id. at 957.
141 See id. at 954–55 (“The national average expense for detaining one juvenile per year is
$148,767 . . . . [a]nd . . . some estimate that the long-term costs to our society of detaining youth
(which include lost future earnings, recidivism, lost future tax revenue, and additional Medicare
and Medicaid spending) range from $7.9 billion to $21.47 billion per year.” (internal cita-
tions omitted)).
2020] PREVENTING PARKLAND 1075
Following the Parkland tragedy, terroristic threats charges originating in schools
and attributable to juvenile students rose steeply.142 Salient instances of violence, like
Parkland, have exacerbated the trend of coalescence between school officials and law
enforcement, the best example being the augmented presence of SROs in our public
schools.143 As a result of these developments, students have been increasingly exposed
to the criminal justice system for adjudication and punishment, which schools previ-
ously would have conducted internally; and the criminalization of school misbehavior
feeds the school-to-prison pipeline. However serious the issue seems in light of these
facts, it is made exponentially more complicated by the proliferation of smartphones
in schools.
II. THE RISE OF SMARTPHONES IN THE CLASSROOM
Smartphone ownership is a visible phenomenon that pervades American life,
and the trends144 suggest smartphones are here to stay—at least until the next
technological jump.145 The craze has spread to the schoolyard, hallways, and class-
rooms of American middle and high schools.146 This Part discusses the rise of
smartphones in schools, including the data supporting this trend and the issues and
implications it poses for school safety and discipline. Given smartphones’ capabili-
ties, they have become the cause of “digital distraction,”147 a conduit of class-
room—and even criminal—misbehavior,148 and the impetus for school policies and
142 See generally Hobbs, supra note 4.
143 See generally Bob Erwin, How States Are Addressing School Safety, NCSL BLOG
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/blog/2018/04/05/how-states-are-addressing-school-safety
.aspx [https://perma.cc/H52U-9MZU] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
144 See MONICA ANDERSON, PEW RESEARCH CTR., TECHNOLOGY DEVICE OWNERSHIP,7–8
(Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/
[https://perma.cc/M4V2-9YZB] (estimating that 68% of American adults had smartphones
in 2015, up from 35% in 2011, and 92% of American adults have a mobile phone of some
kind).
145 See Matt Weinberger, The Smartphone Is Eventually Going to Die, and Then Things
are Going to Get Really Crazy (AAPL, GOOG, GOOGLE, MSFT), BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 2, 2017,
4:36 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/death-of-the-smartphone-and-what-comes-after
-2017-3 [https://perma.cc/W2XT-T5XZ] (arguing that in the next decade, smartphones will
give way to Amazon, Google, and human-machine fusion).
146 See Paul Barnwell, Do Smartphones Have a Place in the Classroom?, ATLANTIC
(Apr. 27, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/04/do-smartphones
-have-a-place-in-the-classroom/480231/ [https://perma.cc/Q5P3-3APF] (detailing a high
school English teacher’s experience with smartphones in school).
147 See Edward C. Baig, Cellphones at School: Should Your Kid Have One?, USA TODAY
(Aug. 14, 2018, 6:02 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/baig/2018/08/14
/should-smartphones-allowed-classroom/959154002/ [https://perma.cc/V2F7-2TVN].
148 See Jennifer Ludden, Opinion: Please Take Away My Kids’ Cellphones at School, NPR
(Aug. 18, 2018, 8:27 AM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/18/639651703/opinion-please-take
-away-my-kids-cellphones-at-school [https://perma.cc/XV3A-4UHH].
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criminal crackdowns,149 which result in school-based punishments or criminal
charges.150
A. Data Show Smartphones Saturate the American Classroom
Smartphones are a pervasive fixture of the American school,151 and most students
bring these “minicomputers”152 to school every day. It is easy to understand why
smartphones saturate the classroom—nearly every student owns one. Approximately
95% of teens say that they have access to a smartphone, a 22% increase from 2014
to 2015.153 In addition to their widespread use among youth, smartphone ownership
is remarkably universal among teens of different genders, races, ethnicities, and
socioeconomic backgrounds.154 Over 90% of boys and girls reported owning smart-
phones.155 Hispanic, black, and white teens reported nearly identical levels of smart-
phone ownership, at between 94% and 95% of students reporting.156 And the
percentage of smartphone ownership changed very little among teens of different
socioeconomic strata.157 Of teens whose parents have less than or the equivalent to
some college education, approximately 94% reported having access to smartphones,
compared to 96% of teens whose parents have a college education or advanced
degree.158
Smartphone ownership eclipses computer ownership among the same popula-
tion of teens. Nearly 45% of those surveyed say they use the Internet “almost con-
stantly,” and that figure has nearly doubled from 24% in 2014–2015.159 Another
44% say they go online several times a day, meaning roughly nine of every ten teens
go online “at least multiple times per day.”160 However, the number of teen smart-
phone owners in the above categories who have access to desktops or laptops drops
dramatically.161 Therefore, these teens are usually using their smartphones to access
the Internet, and frequently.
149 See discussion infra Section II.B.
150 See id.
151 See Barnwell, supra note 146 (detailing a high school English teacher’s experience
with smartphones in school).
152 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 393 (2014).
153 See Anderson & Jiang, supra note 32, at 7.
154 See id.
155 See id.
156 See id.
157 See id. (stating that 93% of teens whose parents earn between $0–74,999 per year reported
having access to smartphones at home compared to 97% of teens whose parents owned $75,000
or more per year).
158 See id.
159 See id. at 8.
160 See id.
161 See id. at 7–8 (stating that approximately 75% percent of students whose parents earn less
than $30,000 per year have access to desktops or laptops, compared to ninety-three percent
of the same teens with access to smartphones).
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Moreover, smartphone usage has increased across all grade levels, though older stu-
dents use smartphones more frequently than younger students.162 In 2015, 53% of
elementary school students, 66% of middle school students, and 82% of high school
students reported using smartphones regularly.163 These numbers are up from 44%,
58%, and 75%, respectively, in 2014.164 And these increases are likewise reflected
in students’ self-reported desire to use smartphones in school.165 Seven in ten ele-
mentary school students, two-thirds of middle school students, and over half of high
school students reported that they would like to use mobile devices more often in
the classroom.166
The data paint a clear picture: the overwhelming majority of teens are accessing
the Internet, most teens are almost certainly accessing it via smartphones, and many
are doing it at school.
B. Smartphones and Student Misconduct: Issue and Implications
Smartphones’ omnipresence in schools means more than juvenile students texting
each other in the hallway or checking the score of the Braves game during Algebra.
Rather, possessing a smartphone is like holding a box filled with inestimable boxes
(known as “apps”167) packed with countless other boxes, each occupied by any number
of (potentially incriminating) things—photographs, video clips, voice recordings,
data and more—leaving one to wonder if Zeus could have done more damage had
he given Pandora168 an iPhone XR169 in lieu of her infamous box.
162 See Harris Poll, supra note 29, at 28.
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 See id. at 18.
166 See id.
167 See Understanding Mobile Apps, FED. TRADE COMMISSION: CONSUMER INFO., https://
www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0018-understanding-mobile-apps [https://perma.cc/T2U9
-K8VM] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) (“A mobile app is a software program you can down-
load and access directly using your phone or another mobile device, like a tablet or music
player.”).
168 Pandora’s Box, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-web
ster.com/dictionary/Pandora%27s%20box [https://perma.cc/6EHY-A5EX] (last visited Apr. 14,
2020) (“Anything that looks ordinary but may produce unpredictable harmful results.”). The
Greek god Prometheus stole fire from other Greek gods and gave it to mankind. As retribution,
the gods created the first woman, Pandora, whom Zeus gave a box containing the then-
unpredictable evils of the world. He told her never to open the box, but, of course, she opened
it the moment he left and loosed those evils on the world. See Pandora, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRI-
TANNICA, https://www.bri tannica.com/topic/Pandora-Greek-mythology [https://perma.cc/B8
68-ZUQA] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
169 See iPhone XR, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/iphone-xr/ [https://perma.cc/HAK5
-TFTU] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
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Smartphone apps are as ever-present as smartphones themselves, and average
smartphone users in 2018 had between sixty and ninety apps on their smartphone.170
These apps access, pull, and store a wide array of personal information. For instance,
a cybersecurity company examined the top 100 free Android and iOS apps on May 3,
2018.171 One such app, Android’s “Brightest Flashlight LED—Super Bright Torch,”
requested of its ten million downloaders precise user location, access to user’s contacts,
access to text messages (SMS), permission to directly call phone numbers, permission
to reroute outgoing calls, access to camera, access to microphone to record audio,
read and write permissions on the phone’s storage, and read permission for phone status
and identity.172 But does a flashlight app needs these permissions to function?173 While
would-be users have the discretion to deny some of these permissions, or simply
forgo downloading the app, “users can still find it difficult to keep track of what they
are consenting to. . . . In short, while you may be sure of your ground when it comes
to a single app with a single privacy policy, once additional apps are plugged into it,
the picture becomes increasingly complex. . . .”174 If adults can be “[b]amboozled
by privacy policies,”175 it is reasonable to assume that juveniles, whose “brains continue
to mature and develop throughout childhood and adolescence and well into early
adulthood,” can be likewise confused or unsure of what information their smart-
phones collect and hold.176
The issue, therefore, goes far beyond the calls and texts juvenile students place and
spans to the other sorts of information their phones contain or can access at the mo-
ment those phones are searched. Widespread use of smartphones—and their several and
varied functions—in schools has become problematic because it disrupts classrooms,
allows students to commit school policy infractions or crimes instantaneously and vir-
tually (as in the BHS anecdote), and creates novel issues of juvenile student privacy.
The implications of smartphones are illuminated by existing data. First, data
suggests that smartphones, in addition to other smart devices like laptops and tablets,
affect the classroom experience. According to one recent survey, seventy percent of sur-
veyed high school teachers say student use of smartphones causes “tension and dis-
ruption” in the classroom.177 50% of those teachers report weekly disruptions due to
170 Gillian Cleary, Mobile Privacy: What Do Your Apps Know About You?, SYMANTEC
THREAT INTELLIGENCE BLOG (Aug. 16, 2018), https://www.symantec.com/blogs/threat-intel
ligence/mobile-privacy-apps [https://perma.cc/6HZY-KNYR].
171 See id.
172 See id.
173 See id.
174 See id.
175 See id.
176 See id.; see also Teen Brain: Behavior, Problem Solving, and Decision Making, AM.
ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY (Sept. 2016), https://www.aacap.org/aacap/fam
ilies_and_youth/facts_for_families/fff-guide/the-teen-brain-behavior-problem-solving-and
-decision-making-095.aspx [https://perma.cc/7MS6-WT96].
177 See Tech in the Classroom, MIDAMERICAN NAZARENE U. (last visited Apr. 14, 2020),
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students’ smartphone use; 36% say disruptions occur daily.178 While these teachers
laud technology like Wi-Fi, laptops, learning software, smartboards, and school-
specific web portals as having a positive effect on the classroom, they view smart-
phones negatively.179 Distraction due to smartphone use is so pervasive that the
California State Teachers’ Pension Fund, an investor in Apple, recently drafted an open
letter calling on Apple to study the issue and make it easier to limit juvenile stu-
dents’ use of the devices.180
Second, smartphone-generated crimes and school policy infractions, like cyber-
bullying181 and social media–based terroristic threats,182 are new phenomena affect-
ing American schools. The National Center for Education Statistics and Bureau of
Justice Statistics indicated in 2015 that, nationwide, approximately 21% of students
ages twelve to eighteen experienced bullying.183 In a separate study, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention estimated that 14.9% of high school students were
electronically bullied in 2017.184 The most common mediums for cyber-bullying in-
clude social media, like Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, and Twitter; text messages;
https://www.mnu.edu/graduate/blogs-ideas/tech-in-the-classroom [https://perma.cc/MKV3
-FN2P].
178 See id.
179 See id.
180 See Anya Kamenetz, Laptops and Phones in the Classroom: Yea, Nay or a Third
Way?, NPR (Jan. 24, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2018/01/24/578437957/laptops
-and-phones-in-the-classroom-yea-nay-or-a-third-way [https://perma.cc/2ZCV-F8LE]; New
Letter from Jana Partners and CALSTRS to Apple, Inc., HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVER-
NANCE (Jan. 19, 2018), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2018/01/19/joint-shareholder-letter
-to-apple-inc/ [https://perma.cc/ZL4U-8QDT].
181 See What Is Cyberbullying, STOPBULLYING.GOV (last modified May 30, 2019), https://
www.stopbullying.gov/cyberbullying/what-is-it/index.html [https://perma.cc/8MSL-7SPY]
(“Cyberbullying includes sending, posting, or sharing negative, harmful, false, or mean
content about someone else. It can include sharing personal or private information about
someone else causing embarrassment or humiliation. Some cyberbullying crosses the line
into unlawful or criminal behavior.”). “Sexting,” or “the ‘transmission of sexually charged
materials’ (typically photos) between students through text messages or other forms of file
transmission” is a subcategory of cyber-bullying, which this Comment does not discuss. See
A. James Spung, From Backpacks to Blackberries: (Re)examining New Jersey v. T.L.O. in
the Age of the Cell Phone, 61 EMORY L.J. 111, 119 (2011).
182 See Bosman, supra note 6; Fowler & Craven, supra note 91.
183 See CHRISTINA YANEZ & DEBORAH LESSNE, STUDENT VICTIMIZATION IN U.S. SCHOOLS:
RESULTS FROM THE 2015 SCHOOL CRIME SUPPLEMENT TO THE NATIONAL CRIME VIC-
TIMIZATION SURVEY, U.S. DEP’T EDUC. 1, 9 (2015), https://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo
.asp?pubid=2018106rev [https://perma.cc/7R49-S5AK] (noting that, from 2007 until 2013
the School Crime Supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey included separate
questions about cyber-bullying, but the definition of bullying has been updated to consider
cyber-bullying as a subset of bullying and not a separate type of bullying).
184 See CDC, YOUTH RISK BEHAVIOR SURVEY: DATA SUMMARY & TRENDS REPORT
2007–2017, at 1, 31 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/data/yrbs/pdf/trendsreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4AYJ-S54F].
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instant messaging apps, which often run through email providers or social media;
and email.185 Likewise, threats issued against other students and schools, which may
materialize into criminal terroristic threats charges, are perpetrated through the same
channels.186 Taken together, smartphones are producing new challenges for teachers,
administrators, and SROs.
Third, because smartphones give rise to cyberinfractions and cybercrimes in the
schoolhouse, teachers, administrators, and SROs more often search the contents of
these devices in investigating “accusations, suspicions, or disputes” related to these
cyber-incidents.187 But because smartphones possess troves of information, a routine
search can quickly veer off course, raising difficult Fourth Amendment questions
regarding juveniles’ privacy rights in their smartphones.
Given the prevalence of smartphone access among teens, as well as smart-
phones’ inherent portability, disruptive capabilities, and capacity to act as conduits
of school policy violations or crimes, schools are grasping for answers to complex
issues of school safety. Meanwhile, scholars are crusading for greater protections
for juvenile students in this new context.188 However, scholars wisely recognize that
[w]hen 38-year-old James Madison worked on his first draft of
the Fourth Amendment 200 years ago, he could not possibly
have envisioned a time when a person would have in his pocket
a device that could be used not only to communicate . . . but to
store . . . personal correspondence, medical records, [and] ad-
dresses of family members and friends.189
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT ON SCHOOLS AND SMARTPHONES
The Fourth Amendment is a frequently litigated provision of the U.S. Constitution,
and it is easy to understand why. According to one view, the Fourth Amendment does
nothing more than “prescribe that government intrusions be limited to reasonable
185 See What Is Cyberbullying, supra note 181.
186 See supra Section I.A.
187 See Spung, supra note 181, at 118; see also, e.g., Jackson v. McCurry, 303 F. Supp. 3d
1367, 1367 (2017).
188 For example, two scholars, Randee J. Waldman, Clinical Professor of Law and Di-
rector of the Barton Juvenile Defender Clinic at the Emory University School of Law, and
Barbara A. Fedders, Assistant Professor of Law and Co-director of the Youth Justice Clinic
at the University of North Carolina School of Law, have recently presented on this topic to
national audiences. See generally Program for 2014 Advanced Juvenile Defender Training,
UNC: SCH. GOV’T (Mar. 12–14, 2014), https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu
/files/course_materials/2014%20Advd%20Juve%20Defender%20Electronic%20Materials
_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VC2W-5Q3G].
189 See H. Morley Swingle, Smartphone Searches Incident to Arrest, 68 J. MO. B. 36, 37
(2012).
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measures.”190 The opposing view asserts that the Fourth Amendment “rules handcuff
the police in their never[-]ending battle to bring criminals to book.”191 Often, whether
the Fourth Amendment was properly followed determines whether someone’s
freedom can be inhibited. Negotiating this balance is difficult on the streets, and the
same holds true in schools where the government’s interest in protecting students
is understandably commanding. This Part explains some of the Fourth Amendment’s
history, including the general rule and the exceptions that apply when dealing with
schools and smartphones; it details seminal case law, including New Jersey v. T.L.O.,192
Riley v. California,193 and important cases in-between; and it lays the groundwork
for a compromise in Part IV.
A. A History of the Fourth Amendment
The modern notion of the Fourth Amendment includes three pillars for all searches
and seizures: (1) a general warrant requirement, (2) a general probable cause require-
ment, and (3) the exclusion of all evidence obtained illegally.194 However, Supreme
Court jurisprudence is somewhat disordered—some would say an “embarrassment.”195
Rather than rehash the work of other scholars who have detailed the Fourth Amend-
ment’s complex past and intricacies,196 this Section reviews the Fourth Amend-
ment’s history as it applies to the seminal cases discussed below. In particular, it
discusses the Fourth Amendment’s warrant and probable cause requirements,197 two
important exceptions to those requirements,198 and the Fourth Amendment’s applica-
tion to students.199
1. The Fourth Amendment’s Warrant and Probable Cause Requirement
The Supreme Court has recognized a warrant requirement, generally, in the Fourth
Amendment: “Where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover
evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining
190 See Tracey Maclin, The Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 35 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 197, 201 (1993).
191 See id. at 198.
192 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
193 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
194 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757,
757 (1994).
195 See id.
196 See id. at 761–80; see also Morgan Cloud, Pragmatism, Positivism, and Principles in
Fourth Amendment Theory, 41 UCLA L. REV. 199, 221–68 (1993); Maclin, supra note 190,
at 202–28; Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
820, 825–30 (1994); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105
YALE L.J. 393, 396–411 (1995).
197 See infra Section III.A.1.
198 See infra Section III.A.2.
199 See infra Section III.D.
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of a judicial warrant.”200 The text of the Fourth Amendment mandates that warrants
be predicated on probable cause,201 and case law has necessitated a narrow scope for
searches and seizures—hence, probable cause is required absent “‘a few specifically
established and well-delineated exceptions.’”202 This general conception of the Fourth
Amendment is “echoed” in many state constitutional provisions.203 But, scholars
agree204 that even the state provisions derive from the same few cases, each of which
reflects a concern the Founders faced.205 For example, some parent cases to the
Fourth Amendment arose when the English were exercising general warrant authority
to search political dissidents’ papers and books.206 Those cases marked in common
law the importance of a privacy interest in homes and chattel and suggested that
arrests must be grounded in cause.207 Other earlier colonial American cases, though
arising in different posture, raised the same concerns—privacy and trepidation over
unlimited government discretion—as their English counterparts.208 These examples,
taken together, underpin the Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause require-
ments, which are reflected in modern case law and read into the Amendment’s
text.209 Today, “[T]hese rules unquestionably limit the investigation of ordinary crimes”
because they bind government officials’ discretion,210 including state officials.211
From these rules, all Fourth Amendment debates issue.
2. Two Exceptions to the Requirement: Exigent Circumstances and Special Needs
As complex as the history of the warrant and probable cause requirements is, the
exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirement are likewise several and
varied.212 Even so, the two exceptions most pertinent to this Comment’s analysis are
200 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 653 (1995)); see also Amar, supra note 194, at 762 (citing Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385, 390 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971); Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14–15 (1948)).
201 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
202 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 357 (1967)).
203 See Stuntz, supra note 196, at 396 (citing JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 38 (1966); Akhil
Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1176 (1991); Osmond
K. Fraenkel, Concerning Searches and Seizures, 34 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361–62 (1921)).
204 See Stuntz, supra note 196, at 447.
205 See M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 6 (1978).
206 See Stuntz, supra note 196, at 397.
207 See id. at 399–400.
208 See id. at 406–07.
209 See id. at 407.
210 See id.
211 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 213 (1960) (applying the Fourth Amendment
to state officials).
212 See Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, “Special Needs” and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception
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the “exigent circumstances” exception, of which the “search incident to arrest” variety
is particularly important, and the “special needs” exception.213
Of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment, “[b]y far the largest category of
exceptions are those based on exigency.”214 The law has recognized for centuries “that
a search of an arrestee’s person and the immediately surrounding area into which he
might reach to obtain a weapon or destroy evidence is permissible as an incident of
the arrest, and thus may be conducted without a search warrant.”215 The lawful arrest
itself serves as the legal pretext for searching the arrestee and the justification is
twofold: protecting law enforcement from unseen dangers such as concealed wea-
pons216 and preventing the destruction of evidence.217 In many of these cases, given
enough manpower, the police could “almost always obtain a warrant without suf-
fering the consequences of the exigency. . . . But the Court . . . has frequently been
willing to define exigency broadly, in light of the realities of law enforcement.”218
Therefore, in many situations where obtaining a warrant would not be impossible,
but rather inexpedient, police are excepted from obtaining a warrant.219
Three cases inform this exception. Chimel v. California illustrates the modern ap-
proach to the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement.220 In the context of a search of an arrestee’s home incident to his arrest,
the Chimel Court held that it is reasonable to search the area “into which an arrestee
might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items,” but searching other
rooms of the arrestee’s home or “other closed or concealed areas in that room itself” is
improper without a warrant.221 The Court applied Chimel to a search of an arrestee’s
person in United States v. Robinson.222 In Robinson, an officer conducted a pat-down,
discovered a cigarette package, and searched the package, uncovering heroin.223 Even
Poised to Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 530
(1997).
213 Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1,
18–19 (1991).
214 Id. at 19.
215 Marc C. McAllister, Rethinking Student Cell Phone Searches, 121 PA. ST. L. REV. 309,
315 (2016).
216 “The peace officer empowered to arrest must be empowered to disarm. If he may disarm,
he may search, lest a weapon be concealed. The search being lawful, he retains what he finds,
if connected with the crime.” People v. Chiagles, 142 N.E. 583, 584 (N.Y. 1923).
217 See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 339 (1978); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 232 (1973).
218 Slobogin, supra note 213, at 21.
219 See id.
220 See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969).
221 Id. at 763; see also Gant, 556 U.S. at 350 (overruling the Court’s decision in New York
v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), and eliminating the automatic right to search the glovebox
of a vehicle as an incident to a vehicle occupant’s arrest).
222 See generally 414 U.S. 218.
223 See id. at 220, 223.
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though there was no specific concern, per the Chimel rationales, that Robinson was
armed or would destroy evidence, the Court concluded that the search of Robinson’s
pockets and the search of his cigarette package were reasonable,224 as the package
was “personal property . . . immediately associated with the person of the arrestee.”225
As in Robinson, the Supreme Court in Arizona v. Gant recognized that the Chimel
concerns motivate the search incident to arrest exception.226 These cases, establish-
ing the Chimel risks, the Robinson diminished privacy interest of the arrestee, and the
Gant standard for allowing a warrantless search amid reasonable belief it will uncover
evidence of the crime, form the analytical framework for the Court’s analysis in
Riley v. California.227
The second exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement relevant
to this Comment is the so-called “special needs” exception.228 Justice Blackmun, in
his concurrence in the seminal case New Jersey v. T.L.O., coined the term when he
wrote: “Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the
Framers.”229 In “special needs” situations, the usual warrant and probable cause re-
quirements of the Fourth Amendment are dispensed with230 because “ordinary police
investigation is not involved”231 and “the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to
frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search.”232
Though “[t]he special needs jargon has surfaced in several opinions . . . including
cases permitting warrantless searches of employees’ offices[233] and probationers’
homes,[234] and warrantless substance abuse testing of customs agents[235] and railway
224 See id. at 220, 236.
225 United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (clarifying the search incident to
arrest exception as applied in Robinson).
226 Gant, 556 U.S. at 343 (holding that police could search a vehicle “only when the ar-
restee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time
of the search”).
227 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
228 See Buffaloe, supra note 212, at 530–31.
229 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
230 See Slobogin, supra note 213, at 25 (“Blackmun was willing to label searches of school
children’s personal effects a special needs situation, . . . eliminating both the warrant and
probable cause requirements in that context.”).
231 Id. at 27–28.
232 Id. at 25 (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340).
233 See O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 724 (1987) (“[W]hen employers conduct an in-
vestigation, they have an interest substantially different from ‘the normal need for law enforce-
ment.’” (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring))); see also id. at 732 (Scalia,
J., concurring) (“‘[S]pecial needs’ are present in the context of government employment.”).
234 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987) (“[Probation s]upervision . . . is
a ‘special need’ of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not
be constitutional if applied to the public at large.”).
235 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989) (“It is clear
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workers,”236 its original application to juveniles in public schools derives from New
Jersey v. T.L.O. For the purposes of this Comment, it is important to remember that
Fourth Amendment rights, like First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, “are differ-
ent in public schools than elsewhere”237 and “the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot
disregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility for children.”238 Thus,
schools historically acted in loco parentis with respect to juvenile students.239 As a
father would not seek a warrant from an impartial magistrate to search his son’s
dresser drawer, a school official has not been required to demonstrate probable cause
or obtain a warrant to search a student’s locker; the Court has found that the “special
needs” of the latter situation (or any exigency the particular situation presents) ex-
empt it from the usual Fourth Amendment requirements.240 This background informed
the Court’s opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
B. New Jersey v. T.L.O.
Any discussion of Fourth Amendment searches of juveniles or their belongings on
school premises begins—and often ends—with New Jersey v. T.L.O.241 This is not sur-
prising, considering that the Supreme Court’s decision in T.L.O. marked its first time
ruling directly on juvenile students’ Fourth Amendment rights.242 The Supreme Court’s
ruling established the current two-part standard for searching juveniles and their
belongings at school,243 which has remained more-or-less untouched since 1985.244
that the Customs Service’s drug-testing program is not designed to serve the ordinary needs
of law enforcement.”).
236 See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989) (“The Government’s
interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure safety,‘presents “special
needs” beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant
and probable-cause requirements.’” (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873–74)).
237 Veronica Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995); see, e.g., Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (finding that public school authorities may censor
school-sponsored publications, so long as the censorship is “reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581–82 (1975) (finding that due process
for a student challenging disciplinary suspension requires only that the teacher “informally
discuss the alleged misconduct with the student minutes after it has occurred”).
238 Acton, 515 U.S. at 656.
239 See McAllister, supra note 215, at 325.
240 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 332 n.2 (1985).
241 See id. at 327.
242 For a discussion on this point, see Allyson M. Tucker, Applying the Fourth Amendment
to Schools: New Jersey v. T.L.O., 31 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 439, 441 (1987); see
also Martin Schiff, The Emergence of Student Rights to Privacy Under the Fourth Amendment,
34 BAYLOR L. REV. 209, 209, 211 (1982) (contrasting the legal basis for school searches with
the Supreme Court’s previous opinion that searches conducted without a warrant violate the
Fourth Amendment per se).
243 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341.
244 The Supreme Court decided New Jersey v. T.L.O. in 1985 and has not overturned its
standard for school searches. Id.
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The Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the exclusionary rule245
applied to searches of juvenile students conducted by public school officials.246 Instead
of answering that question, the Supreme Court laid out the Fourth Amendment
standard for searches by public school officials of juvenile students,247 carving out
the “special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement.248
In a landmark decision, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures applied to searches of juveniles conducted by
public school officials, like principals and teachers.249 The legality of those searches,
however, depends not on probable cause, but on reasonable suspicion—the reason-
ableness of the search under the circumstances;250 and the disputed search in T.L.O.
was reasonable.251
A teacher caught T.L.O., age fourteen, smoking in her high school’s bathroom
in violation of school policy.252 As a result of this violation, the school principal
called T.L.O. into his office and searched her purse.253 While searching T.L.O.’s purse,
the principal uncovered a disciplinarian’s treasure trove: cigarettes, rolling papers, a
small amount of marijuana, a pipe, a number of empty plastic bags, a roll of one-dollar
bills, and an index card and notes indicating students whom T.L.O. sold drugs and from
whom she had not yet collected payment.254 The principal turned over this contra-
band to the police, and the State brought delinquency charges against T.L.O.255
As with most cases that land before the Supreme Court, the lower courts’ con-
flicting findings drove the Court to action. The New Jersey Supreme Court agreed
with the juvenile trial court that a school official’s warrantless search, if reasonable,
245 Exclusionary Rule, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/exclusionary
_rule [https://perma.cc/HLS8-JNRE] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) (“The exclusionary rule
prevents the government from using most evidence gathered in violation of the United States
Constitution. . . . [T]he exclusionary rule applies to evidence gained from an unreasonable
search or seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment[,] . . . improperly elicited self-
incriminatory statements gathered in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and to evidence
gained in situations where the government violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.”).
246 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 327.
247 See id. at 328.
248 See id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Bernard James, T.L.O. and Cell
Phones: Student Privacy and Smart Devices After Riley v. California, 101 IOWA L. REV. 343,
348 (2015) (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339–40).
249 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
250 See id. at 341–43.
251 See id. at 337–42.
252 See id. at 328. Note, however, that this policy only prohibited smoking in the bathroom
of the freshmen and sophomore buildings. See id. at 384. Had T.L.O. smoked in the correct
building, it is unclear whether the Court would have annunciated the same standard for
school searches.
253 See id. at 328.
254 See id.
255 See id. at 328–29.
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would not violate the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement;256 however, it be-
lieved that the juvenile trial court erred when it ruled that searching T.L.O.’s purse
was reasonable.257 Specifically, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that even if the
search were based on reasonable suspicion—and the majority believed it was not—
possession of cigarettes (not smoking them) did not violate school rules and the
principal’s “rummaging” through T.L.O.’s purse was excessive.258 The United States
Supreme Court, after ordering reargument on the broader question of “what limits, if
any, the Fourth Amendment placed on the activities of school authorities,” disagreed.259
Finding that the Fourth Amendment applies to school officials’ searches of
juvenile students,260 the Court enunciated a two-part “special needs” exception to the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement,261 grounded in the “reasonableness,
under all the circumstances, of the search.”262 First, the search must have been
“justified at its inception.”263 “[A] search of a [juvenile] student by a teacher or
school official [is] (justified at its inception) when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is
violating either the law or the rules of the school.”264 Second, the search must have
been “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interfer-
ence in the first place.”265 A search is legitimate in its scope “when the measures
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively
intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.”266
The Court believed that this two-pronged approach would (1) “recognize[] that
maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain degree of flexibility
in school disciplinary procedures” and (2) “respect[] the value of preserving the
informality of the student-teacher relationship.”267
The Court aimed its test at balancing “the substantial interest of teachers and
administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds”
“against the child’s interest in privacy,”268 but school safety tipped the scale.269 While
it recognized that students have legitimate expectations of privacy,270 “the school
256 See id. at 330–31.
257 See id. at 331.
258 See id. (quoting State ex rel. T.L.O., 94 N.J. 331, 347 (1983)).
259 Id. at 332–33.
260 See id. at 337.
261 See id. at 340–41; see also id. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
262 Id. at 341 (majority opinion).
263 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968)).
264 Id. at 341–42.
265 Id. at 341 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20).
266 Id. at 342.
267 See id. at 339–40.
268 See id. at 339.
269 See id. at 339–40.
270 See id. at 339 (“Nor does the State’s suggestion that children have no legitimate need
to bring personal property into the schools seem well anchored in reality. Students at a
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setting require[d] some easing of the restriction to which searches by public authori-
ties are ordinarily subject.”271 In applying its test to the search of T.L.O.’s purse, the
Court found that the school’s interest in prohibiting smoking in certain parts of the
school outweighed T.L.O.’s expectation of privacy in her purse272—the search was
justified at inception because of the teacher’s report that T.L.O. was smoking in the
bathroom generated sufficient suspicion and the search was justified in its scope to
uncover evidence of T.L.O. smoking in the bathroom.273
C. School Searches After T.L.O.
A number of cases demonstrate how the T.L.O. test has been applied and shed
light on the current status of juvenile students’ rights in schools.274
Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton275 and Board of Education v. Earls276
dealt with public school drug testing schemes. In 1995, ten years after its decision
in T.L.O., the Supreme Court in Acton evaluated the constitutionality of an Oregon
public school district’s random drug testing of student athletes.277 The district
believed student athletes were instigating drug use among other student populations,
allegedly provoking misbehavior and, therefore, disciplinary referrals and action.278
Applying its rationale from T.L.O., the Court applied the “special needs” exception
and dispensed with the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause and warrant requirements
when obtaining a urine specimen from student athletes for drug testing purposes.279
Because student athletes voluntarily choose to “go out for the team,” get the requi-
site physical examination to participate, and change and shower in communal spaces,
minimum must bring . . . the supplies needed for their studies, . . . keys, money, and the
necessaries of personal hygiene and grooming. In addition, students may carry on their
persons . . . such nondisruptive yet highly personal items as photographs, letters, and diaries.
Finally, students may have perfectly legitimate reasons to carry with them articles of property
needed in connection with extracurricular or recreational activities. In short, . . . there is no
reason to conclude that they have necessarily waived all rights to privacy in such items
merely by bringing them onto school grounds.”).
271 Id. at 340.
272 See id. at 343–46; see also id. at 342 n.9. But see id. at 382–84 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
273 See id. at 345–47 (majority opinion).
274 See, e.g., Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 364 (2009) (finding
an unreasonable T.L.O. search where the known evidence and inferences did not support
invasive strip search to locate contraband); Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 822 (2002)
(recognizing the diminished privacy expectations of any student that participates in extra-
curricular activities in analyzing a drug-testing program); Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515
U.S. 646, 646 (1995) (recognizing students’ and student athletes’ reduced privacy expectations
in determining the constitutionality of a drug-testing scheme).
275 515 U.S. 646.
276 536 U.S. 822.
277 Acton, 515 U.S. at 648.
278 See id. at 648–49.
279 See id. at 652–53, 57–58 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
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they “have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privileges, including
privacy.”280 The district’s collection of urine specimens from students was not any
more intrusive than that to which students subjected themselves voluntarily.281 In
2002, in Earls, the Court likewise found the random drug testing of students involved
in after-school competition-based extracurriculars to be reasonable,282 comparing it to
being “vaccinat[ed] against disease” or “submit[ting] to physical examinations.”283
In 2009, in Safford United School District #1 v. Redding, school officials searched
a student’s backpack, clothing, and eventually strip-searched the female student, all on
the suspicion that she was distributing over-the-counter and prescription drugs in vio-
lation of school policy.284 The Court found that the searches of the student’s back-
pack and clothing were reasonable, but the Justices drew the line at searching the
student’s undergarments because “nondangerous school contraband does not raise
the specter of stashes in intimate places.”285 The school officials’ motive in remov-
ing drugs from school was valid;286 however, their choice to “make the quantum leap
from outer clothes and backpacks to exposure of intimate parts” was not based on
“any indication of danger to the students from the power of the drugs or their quantity”
or “any reason to suppose that [the student] was carrying pills in her underwear.”287
As a result of the Court’s interpretation of T.L.O. through subsequent cases, we
know juveniles’ “Fourth Amendment rights . . . are different in public schools than
elsewhere; the ‘reasonableness’ inquiry cannot disregard the schools’ custodial and
tutelary responsibility for children.”288 At the same time, “school officials need not
obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their authority.”289 School
officials require only “reasonable suspicion,”290 and the Court affords “high degree
of deference . . . to [their] professional judgment” in deciding when to search and
280 See id. at 657.
281 See id. at 658.
282 See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 825–26 (2002).
283 See id. at 830–31 (citing Acton, 515 U.S. at 656).
284 557 U.S. 364, 368–69 (2009).
285 See id. at 373–74, 376 (noting that the reports prompting the search were several days
old and did not implicate the student’s underwear).
286 See id. at 377–79 (awarding school officials qualified immunity due to the complicated
nature of the Court’s holding in T.L.O., as evidenced by other courts’ inability to use the
precedent correctly).
287 Id. at 376–77.
288 Acton, 515 U.S. at 656. However, the Court does not distinguish between schools’
responsibilities to the individual child and their responsibilities to the student body in general.
See id. Indeed, this Comment implicitly asserts that these might be separate considerations
and, at times, at odds with each other when an individual child’s privacy is compromised in
the furtherance of school safety.
289 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985).
290 See id. at 345 (reasonable suspicion in the school context is “reasonable grounds for
suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating
either the law or the rules of the school”).
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with what scope.291 But while this standard appears clear and succinct, it differs from
the general warrant requirement for police officers292 and begs an answer to the ques-
tion: What, legally, is a “school official” for the purposes of a Fourth Amendment
search of a juvenile student at school?
D. Who Is a “School Official” for Purposes of the Fourth Amendment?
The Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. and its progeny fails to delineate who
is a “school official” for the purposes of a Fourth Amendment search of a juvenile
student at school.293 The lack of a definition for “school official” and the confusing
status of SROs raises the question: “[D]o SROs, who fill both law enforcement and
educational roles in their schools, need probable cause . . . to conduct a constitutionally
permissible search of a student in school?”294 Lower courts have attempted to answer
the question for themselves, and four distinct categories have emerged: (1) “School
Officials Acting Alone,” (2) “Police Officers Acting Alone,” (3) “SRO[s] Acting
Alone,” and (4) “School Officials Acting in Concert with Law Enforcement.”295
First, T.L.O. was clear that school officials, like teachers and principals, require
only reasonable suspicion to search students at schools.296 This lower standard “strikes
the balance between the student’s legitimate expectation of privacy and the school’s
291 See Redding, 557 U.S. at 377.
292 See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014) (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 653).
293 See 469 U.S. at 341 n.7 (“We here consider only searches carried out by school
authorities acting alone and on their own authority. This case does not present the question
of the appropriate standard for assessing the legality of searches conducted by school
officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies, and we express
no opinion on that question.”). This is likely because the Court decided T.L.O. in 1985—over
a decade before Columbine—and SROs are a more recent phenomenon in response to recent
violence in schools. See discussion supra Section I.B.
294 Wolf, supra note 100, at 230; accord PHILLIP A. HUBBART, MAKING SENSE OF SEARCH
AND SEIZURE LAW: A FOURTH AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 170 (2005) (“[Probable cause is a]
practical, non-technical evidentiary showing of individualized wrongdoing that amounts to
more than reasonable suspicion, but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”); see also
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983) (“[P]robable cause is a flexible, common-sense
standard. It merely requires that the facts available to the officer would ‘warrant a man of
caution in the belief,’ . . . that certain items may be contraband . . . or useful as evidence of
a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than
false.” (internal citations omitted)); cf. id. (“[Reasonable suspicion] amounts to less than
probable cause and considerably less than preponderance of the evidence, but more than an
inchoate hunch.”).
295 Katayoon Majd et al., Defending Clients Who Have Been Searched and Interrogated
at School: A Guide for Juvenile Defenders, NAT’L JUV. DEFENDER CTR. 8–9 (2013), https://
njdc.info/wp-content/uploads/2013/11/Defending-Clients-Who-Have-Been-Searched-and
-Interrogated-at-School.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZ5J-9RCE].
296 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340–41.
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interest in maintaining a safe and effective learning environment.”297 The rationale
behind this approach is to “‘ensure that the interests of students will be invaded no
more than is necessary’ to preserve school order.”298
Second, the standard applied to police searches is likewise clear: When police
officers who are acting alone search juvenile students at school, they are typically
required to have probable cause.299 Courts are likelier to require probable cause of
police officers in a few instances. A police officer who is not working as an SRO, for
example, and conducts a search of a juvenile student at school is generally required
to have probable cause.300 If the purpose of the search is to uncover criminal conduct,
then the officer in question will likely require probable cause.301 Also, if the officer
initiated the search, rather than a school official, he will likely require probable cause.302
Third, the SRO’s dubious legal status is reflected in a split among jurisdictions
as to which standard—probable cause or reasonable suspicion—will apply when a
SRO conducts search of a juvenile student at school.303 Courts typically consider “who
employs the officer, who the officer reports to, and the officer’s assigned duties” in
determining which standard will apply.304 “The majority of jurisdictions find that
reasonable suspicion is required based on a finding that a police officer acting as an
SRO is more closely connected to the school than the police department,”305 despite
the fact that SROs assist police in arresting juvenile students for criminal conduct
and are statutorily considered law enforcement.306 Other courts have “distinguished
between . . . officers employed by the school district (which require reasonable
suspicion [to search]) and those employed by an outside police department and
assigned to the schools (which require probable cause).”307
Finally, when school officials act in concert with law enforcement, jurisdictions
have likewise disagreed as to the appropriate standard by which they measure the
validity of a school search.308 Reasonable suspicion may be required when the school
exercises primary control over the search,309 law enforcement is minimally involved
in the search, “school officials initiate the investigation and law enforcement officers
297 See Majd et al., supra note 295, at 8.
298 Id. (quoting T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 343).
299 See Majd et al., supra note 295, at 8.
300 See Pinard, supra note 92, at 1082 n.68; see also Majd et al., supra note 295, at 8.
301 See Pinard, supra note 92, at 1082.
302 See id.
303 See Majd et al., supra note 295, at 8.
304 Id. (internal citations omitted).
305 Id.
306 See supra Section I.B.
307 See Majd et al., supra note 295, at 8 (internal citations omitted). This Comment
proposes adopting the position of these courts in order to make clear the parameters of SROs’
authority to search students and provide all parties concerned with a bright-line rule and
accompanying certainty. See discussion infra Part IV.
308 See Majd et al., supra note 295, at 9.
309 Id.
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search a student at the request or direction of school officials,” and school officials
search juvenile students “based on information from, or in the presence of, law en-
forcement officers.”310 Probable cause, however, is usually required when a “law
enforcement officer generally works outside of the school system and is simply on
assignment at the school (if the officer is not acting under [the] school’s direction)”;
“when [a] school official is acting at the behest of law enforcement”; or, “in a few
jurisdictions for all searches performed by law enforcement, regardless of who initi-
ated the search.”311
Given the dramatic difference in the standards applied to law enforcement officers’
searches and school officials’ searches, it becomes clear why the legal classification
of SRO searches matters. If SROs are treated as school officials for the purposes of
school searches, including smartphone searches on school premises, then SROs pos-
sess two substantial advantages: (1) they require less than the probable cause standard
applied to police to conduct a search, and (2) SROs can suspect the student of vio-
lating a school rule, “such as possessing cell phones . . . considered contraband in
school” but not elsewhere, in order to initiate a search.312 SROs could then provide
the fruits of their search to police. Likewise, the different standards applied to school
officials’ searches when conducted in concert with law enforcement seems like a loop-
hole for law enforcement to circumvent probable cause. Thus, what might be an
advantage for SROs, law enforcement, and school officials in their quest for school
safety could have detrimental effects on students.
E. Riley v. California
The Supreme Court in Riley v. California,313 reconciling two companion cases,
held that the government’s interests in (1) protecting officers’ safety314 and (2) pre-
venting the destruction of evidence315 did not justify jettisoning the Fourth Amend-
ment’s warrant requirement with respect to searching smartphones316 incident to
310 Id. (citing State v. McKinnon, 558 P.2d 781, 784–85 (Wash. 1977)).
311 Id. (citing State v. K.L.M., 628 S.E.2d 651, 653 (Ga. 2006); A.J.M. v. State, 617 So.2d
1137, 1138 (Fla. App. 1993), distinguished by State v. N.G.B., 806 So.2d 567, 569 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2002)).
312 See Wolf, supra note 100, at 226–27.
313 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
314 See id. at 387. See generally Arizona v. Gant, 566 U.S. 332 (2009); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
315 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 387–88. See generally Gant, 566 U.S. 332; Chimel, 395 U.S. 752.
316 In Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, he notes, “According to Riley’s uncontradicted
assertion, the phone was a ‘smart phone,’ a cell phone with a broad range of other functions
based on advanced computing capability, large storage capacity, and Internet connectivity.”
Riley, 573 U.S. at 379. While the Justices refer to “cell phones,” they noted Riley possessed
a “smartphone” with additional capabilities, not a “cell phone,” which traditionally had only
the ability to place calls, send text messages, and, possibly, take phonographs. See id. at 393
(“The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact
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arrest.317 The virtue of Riley lies primarily in its narrow holding. Unlike the broad
question it answered in T.L.O., the Supreme Court in Riley resolved a much more
tailored issue: “Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching
a [smartphone] incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”318
Lower courts split on deciding two factually similar cases: the principal case,
which played out in California state courts, and the companion case, which the federal
court considered.319 In the principal case, police stopped Riley for driving with ex-
pired tags.320 During the stop, police discovered that Riley’s license was suspended
and, pursuant to department policy, impounded the car and conducted an inventory
search.321 The warrantless search led the police to uncover two concealed firearms
and arrest Riley.322 Incident to that arrest, police searched Riley’s pockets and seized
a smartphone.323 During a search of Riley’s smartphone, police uncovered “a lot of
stuff”—videos, texts, and pictures—that demonstrated gang involvement.324 The
State subsequently charged Riley with a number of crimes in connection with an
earlier gang-related shooting, including firing at an occupied vehicle, assault with
a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted murder.325
Recognizing “reasonableness” as the “ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amend-
ment,” the Court evaluated the merits of a warrantless search of Riley’s smartphone
incident to his lawful arrest, and diverged from the lower court.326 The California
state courts allowed the search of Riley’s smartphone under the search-incident-to-
arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment because the phone was in Riley’s law-
fully searched pockets at the time of his arrest.327 The Supreme Court disagreed.328
minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as a telephone.”). Accord-
ingly, this Comment replaces “cell phone” with “smartphone” where applicable.
317 See id. at 386–89; cf. id. at 404–06 (Alito, J., concurring in part) (“I am not convinced at
this time that the ancient rule on searches incident to arrest is based exclusively (or even pri-
marily) on the need to protect the safety of arresting officers and the need to prevent the
destruction of evidence . . . . It has long been accepted that written items found on the person
of an arrestee may be examined and used at trial. But once these items are taken away from
an arrestee (something that obviously must be done before the items are read), there is no risk
that the arrestee will destroy them. Nor is there any risk that leaving these items unread will
endanger the arresting officers.”).
318 Id. at 403 (majority opinion).
319 See id. at 379–81. In the interest of brevity and given that both cases were similar
enough for the Supreme Court to consolidate them for the same appeal, I will only discuss
the principal case.
320 Id. at 378.
321 Id.
322 See id.
323 See id. at 378–79.
324 See id. at 379 (internal citations omitted).
325 See id.
326 Id. at 381, 385–86 (internal citations omitted).
327 See id. at 379–80.
328 See id. at 386.
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Applying the same balancing test it did in T.L.O.329 and weighing the govern-
ment’s Chimel interests of protecting law enforcement and preserving evidence,330
the Court found Riley’s privacy interest in his smartphone’s contents weightier.331
The Justices did not believe that California’s enunciated government interests—
protecting law enforcement and preventing destruction of evidence—were at stake
for two reasons332: (1) the data stored on smartphones does not pose an immediate
risk of harm to law enforcement officers333 and (2) once seized, suspected offenders
cannot destroy the contents of their smartphones.334
The Court distinguished searching a smartphone from searching personal property
incident to an arrest335 and maintained that requiring a warrant to search a smart-
phone would neither place law enforcement at a disadvantage nor proscribe such a
search in an exigent circumstance.336 Because of their supercomputing capabilities
and vast storage, “[m]odern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy concerns
far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack,337 a wallet, or a purse.”338
A search of a smartphone’s contents incident to arrest is more comparable to a search
of an “arrestee’s entire house[,] . . . a substantial invasion beyond the arrest itself.”339
Considering the unique nature of smartphones and lacking “precise guidance from
the founding era,”340 the Supreme Court held that the “diminished privacy interests”
of arrestees were not enough to outweigh their privacy interests in their smart-
phones;341 therefore, absent exigent circumstances, law enforcement must obtain a
warrant to search them, even incident to an arrest.342
329 See id. at 385; cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (explaining that “the
legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the
circumstances, of the search”).
330 Riley, 573 U.S. at 386.
331 See id. at 386–94.
332 See id. at 386.
333 See id. at 386–87.
334 See id. at 388.
335 See id. at 392–93 (“[Smartphones] could just as easily be called cameras, video
players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or
newspapers” due to their “immense storage capacity. . . . Most people cannot lug around
every piece of mail they have received for the past several months, every picture they have
taken, or every book or article they have read . . . . [a]nd if they did, they would have to drag
behind them a trunk of the sort held to require a search warrant.”).
336 See id. at 382–93. Other exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
such as the exception for exigent circumstances, would still apply as needed.
337 See generally United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
338 See Riley, 573 U.S. at 393.
339 See id. at 391–92.
340 See id. at 385.
341 See id. at 392–93.
342 See id. at 400–01.
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Given these cases discussed in Part III, this Comment suggests in Part IV a way
to negotiate the void between protecting juvenile students’ constitutional rights and
maintaining the ability of school officials, police, and SROs to keep schools safe.
IV. CURBING THREATS AND ELIMINATING CHARGES
Taking T.L.O. and the Supreme Court’s (relatively static) holdings in T.L.O.’s
progeny together with Riley, and considering the recent developments in school
discipline following the Parkland tragedy, it is imperative to reconsider whether our
current standards for searching juvenile students still suffice. In T.L.O., in defense
of school officials’ “substantial interest” in school safety and discipline, Justice White
remarked, “Maintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in recent
years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms.”343 That decision was
issued in 1985 and, as the saying goes, that was then. It is difficult to imagine that
Justice White could have predicted the wrinkle of modern technology, particularly
smartphones, in school order or forms of disorder uglier than the likes of Parkland,
among other American schools.
In Riley, nearly thirty years after T.L.O. was decided, Justice Alito issued a chal-
lenge to the Court:
[W]e should not mechanically apply the rule used in the pre-
digital era to the search of a cell phone. Many cell phones now
in use are capable of storing and accessing a quantity of infor-
mation, some highly personal, that no person would ever have
had on his person in hard-copy form. This calls for a new bal-
ancing of law enforcement and privacy interests.344
This Part seeks to answer Justice Alito’s call. First, it recommends a new standard,
“reasonable suspicion-plus,” which stakes out a compromise between the reasonable
suspicion standard traditionally applied to students in T.L.O.345 and the probable
cause warrant requirement applied to searches of smartphones in Riley.346 This new
standard would require that school officials memorialize the reason for and scope
of every search of a juvenile student’s smartphone, absent exigency.347 To illustrate how
this would work in practice, this Part also applies “reasonable suspicion-plus” to the
BHS example detailed in the Introduction.348 And it recommends that SROs and
school officials working in concert with law enforcement should be treated as law
343 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985).
344 Riley, 573 U.S. at 406–07 (Alito, J., concurring in part).
345 See supra Sections III.B, III.C.
346 See supra Section III.E.
347 See infra Section IV.A.
348 See supra Introduction.
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enforcement, not school officials, for the purposes of a Fourth Amendment smartphone
search in school.349 Second, this Part proposes one policy schools could implement
in order to curb school threats while maintaining students’ privacy.350 Legislatures,
acting more nimbly than the courts, should implement school-based threat assess-
ment,351 a viable alternative to zero tolerance policies that balances schools’ interest
in protecting students with students’ interest in their own individual well-being.
A. Answering Alito’s Call: Reimagining the T.L.O. Test Through a Riley Lens
Currently, cases involving searches of juvenile students almost exclusively
apply T.L.O.352 At first glance, this makes sense because T.L.O. deals squarely with
a classic search of students caught violating school policy.353 In such cases, school
officials do not need a warrant if the search is justified at its inception and reason-
able in scope.354 Riley is typically an afterthought in these cases, if it is considered
at all, because Riley involved a search incident to arrest and requires law enforce-
ment to obtain warrants before searching smartphones.355 As far as juvenile students
and schools are concerned, an application of either case without consideration of the
other is disadvantageous. If, as is currently the case, T.L.O. is applied without Riley,
students’ privacy rights are secondary to the discretion of school officials and SROs,
who are treated like school officials in many jurisdictions356 and do not need war-
rants in “special needs” zones.357 On the other hand, if Riley were adopted wholesale,
school officials would be required to obtain warrants in order to search smartphones in
relation to violations of school policy, like cyber-bullying in school, or alleged crimes,
like threatening to bring a gun to school. Such a requirement would force principals and
teachers to act as both student mentor and enforcer of the law, playing the same role for
which SROs are so often criticized,358 straining an already overwrought relationship.
The T.L.O. analysis lapses when applied to juvenile students’ smartphones be-
cause it fails to consider, as the Supreme Court did in Riley, how invasive searches
of smartphones actually are.359 Searching a carton of cigarettes in student’s pocket
or bag, as in Robinson or T.L.O., is not the same thing as searching a smartphone in
2019.360 For one thing, cigarette cartons—like pockets, backpacks, lockers, and even
undergarments—are containers, the contents of which are constrained by their physical
349 See supra Section III.D.
350 See infra Section IV.A.
351 See infra Section IV.B.
352 See supra Section III.C.
353 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 328 (1985).
354 See supra notes 257–63 and accompanying text.
355 See supra Section III.E.
356 See supra Section I.B.
357 See supra Section III.A.2.
358 See Pinard, supra note 92, at 1120.
359 See supra Section III.B.
360 See discussion supra Part III.
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form and size.361 Smartphones, however, are more akin to Mary Poppins’ bottomless
magic carpet bag, with seemingly endless apps that pull, send, and store information
about their owner, aside from stored text messages, phone records, geolocation data,
photos, and videos, that may be conjured up with a touch. School officials and law
enforcement need only reach in, and they will surely find something they can use.
Similarly, pockets are not password protected, nor can they be opened with a glance.362
For this reason, the Court in Riley afforded smartphone owners with a higher ex-
pectation of privacy in their smartphones than in their pockets.363 The question, then,
is how that heightened level of privacy should affect a search of a smartphone in a
school, a “special needs” zone.364
This Comment assumes four facts in answering that question: (1) students own
smartphones and will bring them to school, regardless of school policies to the con-
trary;365 (2) students use smartphone apps like Instagram and Snapchat to act out,
which may include threatening other students’ safety;366 (3) school officials’ interest
in school safety and discipline can outweigh students’ interests in privacy, a point on
which the Supreme Court appears unwilling to compromise according to T.L.O.,367
Acton,368 Earls,369 and Redding;370 and (4) as Justice Roberts stated in Riley, a search
of a smartphone is more exposing than “the most exhaustive search of a house”
because a phone “contains a broad array of private information never found in a home
in any form.”371 These assumptions, rooted in data and precedent, illuminate the
present-day challenges schools face. The Supreme Court’s failure to reconcile T.L.O.
and its progeny with Riley only exacerbates these issues, allowing school officials and
SROs to search students’ smartphones for school policy infractions under the less
stringent reasonable suspicion standard372 in the interest of school safety and disci-
pline,373 circumventing Riley’s probable cause requirement for searching smart-
phones,374 violating students’ privacy,375 and creating more points of contact between
students and the criminal justice system.376
361 See supra Sections III.A.2 and III.B.
362 See iPhone XR, supra note 169.
363 See supra Section III.E. See generally Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
364 See supra Section III.A.2.
365 See discussion supra Part II.
366 See discussion supra Part I.
367 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
368 Veronica Sch. Dist. 475 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
369 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
370 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009).
371 Riley, 573 U.S. at 396–97.
372 See supra Section III.D.
373 See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 339 (1985); see also supra Sections III.B, III.D.
374 See supra Section III.E.
375 See supra Sections I.B, I.C, II.B.
376 See discussion supra Part I.
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In order to balance students’ privacy with school officials’ substantial interest
in safety and discipline,377 and recognizing both that “special needs may, in certain
circumstances, justify a search policy designed to further non–law enforcement ends”
and that smartphones occupy a unique position in modern American culture warranting
heightened privacy,378 this Comment suggests a new legal standard for searching
smartphones in schools, dubbed “reasonable suspicion-plus.” First, school officials—
principals and teachers—should articulate the rationale underpinning their searches
and their intended scope in order to justify invading the heightened privacy interest
the Court vested in smartphones.379 Second, if teachers go beyond the scope of what
they communicate to the district representative, whatever evidence they uncover
should be excluded from use in either school disciplinary proceedings or criminal
trial.380 Third, SROs should be considered law enforcement, not school officials, for
Fourth Amendment purposes, and any joint school official–law enforcement search
of a student’s smartphone should require probable cause.381 These changes will not
only respect the Court’s special needs concerns enunciated in T.L.O.,382 but they will
also apply Riley383 to juvenile students for the first time, allow school officials and
law enforcement the flexibility and agility they need to avert school violence, and
prevent students from being relegated to the school-to-prison pipeline.
First, when school officials determine they will search a student’s smartphone,
they should memorialize the reason for that search and the scope of that search in
an email to the district superintendent, general counsel, or another individual whom
the school district elects as a representative to receive notice.384 The Supreme Court
allows school officials a “high degree of deference . . . to [their] professional judgment”
in deciding when to search students or their possessions.385 So, school officials’
searches, in effect, are presumptively reasonable at their inception.386 However, a
reading of Riley makes clear that citizens’ privacy interests in their smartphones is
derivative of smartphones’ expansive capacity for both the storage and transmission
377 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339; see also supra Sections III.B, III.D.
378 Pinard, supra note 92, at 1100; see supra Sections II.A, III.E.
379 See supra Sections II.A, III.E.
380 See supra note 245.
381 See supra Section III.D.
382 See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339; see also supra Sections III.B, III.D.
383 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (2014).
384 This Comment is not concerned with the authority presumed by the representative for
notice, nor that individual’s legal training (though, that person would ideally be well-versed
in Fourth Amendment search jurisprudence). Indeed, this person would merely serve as an
impartial record-keeper so that later ex-post challenges to the school official’s search could
be free from tainted evidence: emails edited after-the-fact, misplaced memoranda, verbal
notice, and more.
385 Safford Unified Sch. Dist. #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 377 (2009).
386 See supra Sections III.B, III.C, III.D.
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of personal information.387 Therefore, applying reasonable suspicion-plus would
realistically only restrict the scope of school officials’ searches of smartphones.
When considering the scope of a search of a juvenile student at school, Redding388
proves informative. Although the Supreme Court in Acton389 and Earls390 high-
lighted the diminished expectation of privacy students experience,391 the Court drew
an important line when it invalidated the strip-search of the juvenile student in
Redding.392 In doing so, the Supreme Court didn’t reject T.L.O.; instead, the Court
said the search was unreasonable because the suspicion “[did] not raise the specter”
of searching the student in that intrusive way.393 In other words, the scope of the
search was unreasonable. Similarly, according to reasonable suspicion-plus, the
scope of a smartphone search should correspond with the particular suspicion that
instigated the search and should not go beyond the articulated scope without justifi-
cation.394 This respects T.L.O.’s reasonable suspicion standard for “special needs”
zones.395 It is also supported by the deference T.L.O. affords school officials for
determining what searches are reasonable at their inception;396 after all, the Supreme
Court told us in Redding that “the legitimacy of a [school] rule usually goes without
saying.”397 And it simultaneously honors Riley’s focus on the specific facts of each
smartphone search.398
387 See supra Section III.E.
388 557 U.S. 364; see also Section III.C.
389 Veronica Sch. Dist. 475 v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); see also Section III.C.
390 Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002); see also Section III.C.
391 See supra Section III.C.
392 557 U.S. 364; see also Section III.C.
393 See Redding, 557 U.S. at 376.
394 For example, if a teacher emailed the district superintendent and said she had reasonable
suspicion (and the requisite facts) to believe Tommy was bullying Gina on Facebook, and
upon searching Tommy’s Facebook messages to Gina she uncovered evidence of a drug
distribution scheme, including a list of names, photographs of drugs, and indications that
Tommy texted Gina about her next customer, that teacher has developed probable cause to
believe Tommy’s text messages to Gina contain additional evidence of their drug conspiracy.
She can lawfully, under T.L.O. or reasonable suspicion-plus, search Tommy’s text messages.
Likewise, under Riley, law enforcement would have probable cause to obtain a warrant to
search Tommy’s smartphone.
395 See supra Section III.B.
396 See supra Section III.B.
397 Redding, 557 U.S. at 371 n.1; see also supra Section III.C.
398 In light of the availability of the exigent circumstances exception, there
is no reason to believe that law enforcement officers will not be able to
address some of the more extreme hypotheticals . . . . The critical point
is that, unlike the search incident to arrest exception, the exigent cir-
cumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency
justified a warrantless search in each particular case.
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 402 (2014). Acton, Earls, and Redding all dealt with the
schools’ interest in keeping drugs out of the hands of students, which the Court never
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Importantly, this would not impose a warrant requirement on school officials
who “need not obtain a warrant before searching a student who is under their author-
ity.”399 Moreover, reasonable suspicion-plus would not require approval from the
representative for notice, or the sort of administrative warrant other scholars support.400
A wait-to-search requirement, while appealing for its ability to curb the criminal-
ization of youth misbehavior,401 is not grounded in the current dueling standards of
T.L.O.402 and Riley.403 The reasonable suspicion-plus standard, however, is flexible
enough to allow school officials because it doesn’t require approval, which could
prove difficult to acquire or untimely when it eventually comes.404 Instead, school
officials could simply send an email articulating the rationale and scope of their search,
conduct the search, and swiftly achieve their stated interest of maintaining students’
safety or discipline. The thirty seconds to five minutes it would take to write and
send the email would not prevent school officials from acting swiftly to restore
classroom order. And school officials could always confiscate a student’s phone pur-
suant to school policy to restore order in the shorter term, and then proceed to draft
and send a “search-scope” email.
Likewise, school officials would not be bound by the reasonable suspicion-plus
standard in emergency circumstances. Riley carved out an exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s probable cause and warrant requirements for exigent circumstances
in the criminal context,405 and threats alluding to the sort of violence visited upon
Parkland would fit reasonably within that exception. In exigent circumstances—
threats of gun violence, bomb threats, or other threats of mass violence, all of which
have criminal implications—police, SROs, and school officials would be covered.406
Where do exigent circumstances end and Fourth Amendment protections for
juvenile students and their smartphones begin? Recall the example of Brockton High
School in Massachusetts and Brunswick High School in Georgia.407 In that example,
questioned. See supra Section III.C. In Riley, the Supreme Court approved the government’s
interest in protecting officers and preventing the destruction of evidence. Riley, 573 U.S. at
387–88. The Court only debated the scope of each search, not the reason for it. See id.
399 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 349 (1985).
400 See McAllister, supra note 215, at 314 (calling for “independent review of a school
official’s desire to search a student cell phone, along with an administrative warrant that a
head school official must sign before a student’s cell phone may be searched”).
401 See id. (“[F]reedoms are necessarily curtailed due to the level of supervision required
in public schools.”).
402 469 U.S. at 340 (“Maintaining security and order in the schools requires a certain
degree of flexibility in school disciplinary procedures.”).
403 573 U.S. at 406–07 (Alito, J., concurring in part) (“[W]e should not mechanically apply
the rule used in the predigital era to the search of a cell phone.”).
404 Imagine, for example, that the district superintendent is on vacation. School officials
cannot be expected to wait until she returns to reinstate order and safety in their classrooms.
405 See Pinard, supra note 92, at 1100.
406 See supra Section III.A.2.
407 See supra notes 1–23 and accompanying text.
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the contours of exigency were clear. Due to the seriousness of the threat, it would
have been covered by the exigency exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant re-
quirement.408 Moreover, Brunswick-area law enforcement officers would have had
probable cause to search the student-perpetrator’s phone, and they probably could
have obtained a warrant.409 However, the situation could have been much more compli-
cated at Brockton High School. Under either the exigency exception or the Supreme
Court’s current interpretation of T.L.O., school officials, SROs, and police probably
could have searched any student’s smartphone: The goal of protecting the Brockton
student body would have been reasonable at its inception, and searching students’
smartphones to identify the perpetrator of a threat of mass violence could be consid-
ered reasonable in scope, particularly given the proximity of this scare to the Parkland
tragedy. In this case, the perpetrator of the threat would have been sitting nearly 1,000
miles away in Brunswick, while Brockton students’ phones were searched, possibly
resulting in unrelated criminal charges.410 Fortunately, Brunswick-area officers identi-
fied the threat before any Brockton students faced violations of their privacy.411
Under the standard this Comment proposes, the ultimate outcome of this story
would likely remain unchanged, but students’ privacy interests would be bolstered.
School officials in Brockton could confiscate students’ phones if officials had reason
to believe students were involved in the threat.412 But once the threat was neutral-
ized, the exigency (and the authority it provided) would dissolve.413 Assuming that
Brockton school officials had reasonable suspicion to believe some students were
continuing to share the Brunswick-based threat via Instagram, for example, they
would be required to employ the reasonable suspicion-plus standard to search students’
phones: Curbing the transmission of threats is a reasonable goal at its inception, but
the scope of Brockton school officials’ searches (as articulated in an email to the school
district’s representative for notice) would be limited to Instagram absent another
ground for searching outside that scope. Without more, school officials would have
to rely on law enforcement to thoroughly investigate, obtain probable cause and a
warrant, and search the phones as Riley requires.414
Second, if teachers search beyond the scope of what they stipulate to the district
representative, whatever evidence they uncover should be excluded from use in crimi-
nal trial.415 Under the reasonable suspicion-plus standard, a search of a student’s
408 See supra Section III.A.2.
409 See supra Section III.A.1; see also supra note 294.
410 This Comment does not assert that school safety from threats of mass violence is not
a legitimate policy goal that justifies a search of a juvenile student’s smartphone. It only
recommends caution through its proposed standard.
411 See supra notes 1–23 and accompanying text.
412 See supra Section III.A.2.
413 See supra Section III.A.2.
414 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014); see also supra Section III.E.
415 See supra notes 245, 419–92 and accompanying text. Recall, T.L.O. dealt with a
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smartphone that ventures beyond articulated scope is per se violative of the Fourth
Amendment because it is unreasonable. The Court in T.L.O. noted that “to receive
the protection of the Fourth Amendment, an expectation of privacy must be one that
society is ‘prepared to recognize as legitimate.’”416 The Court in Riley recognized that
society has a unique expectation of privacy in smartphones.417 Therefore, the Fourth
Amendment’s “prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures applies to searches
conducted by public school officials”418 and logically extends to smartphone searches.
Since Mapp v. Ohio, evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment has
been excluded from admission in a criminal prosecution.419 The Supreme Court
addressed exclusion in T.L.O., noting:
The question whether evidence should be excluded from a crimi-
nal proceeding involves two discrete inquiries: whether the
evidence was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and
whether the exclusionary rule is the appropriate remedy for the
violation. Neither question is logically antecedent to the other,
for a negative answer to either question is sufficient to dispose
of the case.420
So, whether evidence should be excluded should depend on this two-part inquiry. And
this Comment argues (1) that any search beyond the scope a school official articulates
in his reasonable suspicion-plus email or memorandum would violate the Fourth
Amendment, as argued above, and (2) the exclusionary rule is generally the appropriate
remedy for evidence seized from searches that violate the Fourth Amendment.421
If school officials chose to search after the BHS threat had dissipated, then any
evidence of other unrelated illicit behavior would be suppressed ex post in a crimi-
nal prosecution unless it was obtained within the articulated reasonable suspicion-
plus scope or under a different theory of cause. That way, students’ privacy interests
violation of school policy, not a crime, and violations of school policy should be treated
differently than crimes. See generally New Jersey v. T.L.O. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). Even so,
students should not be penalized for unwarranted intrusions into their privacy that result in
evidence of violations of school protocol.
416 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 587, 526 (1984)).
417 See supra Section III.E. See generally Riley, 573 U.S. 373.
418 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333.
419 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (“[A]ll evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in a state court.”).
420 T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 333 n.3. Note, however, that the Court recognized that, at the time
of its decision, only Georgia state courts “held that although the Fourth Amendment applies
to the schools, the exclusionary rule does not.” Id. at n.2.
421 See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 660 (holding evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment cannot generally be used against the person whose Fourth Amendment rights were
violated); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914).
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in their smartphones would most likely remain intact at both BHS campuses, students
would avoid the school-to-prison pipeline, and the schools’ important interest in
protecting their students and maintaining discipline would be served.
Third, SROs should be considered law enforcement for Fourth Amendment
purposes, and any joint school official–law enforcement search of a student’s
smartphone should require probable cause. Because SROs occupy a unique position,
straddling the line between law enforcement and school official,422 they are often
treated differently in different jurisdictions. Given the proliferation of SROs in
American schools, the fact that they are sometimes armed, that they are statutorily
considered law enforcement, and that they work in concert with and are often em-
ployed by police departments, it is more appropriate to treat SROs as law enforce-
ment for Fourth Amendment purposes.423 Likewise, school officials acting in concert
with law enforcement should be subjected to a probable cause standard for searches.
Probable cause is already required when school officials conduct a search at the
behest of law enforcement.424 But it can’t be said that the search is any less intrusive
when school officials maintain control of the search.425 Either situation results in law
enforcement uncovering potentially incriminating evidence. A bright-line rule man-
dating a probable cause standard for SROs and school officials working in concert
with law enforcement (including SROs) would eliminate confusion and remain
consistent with the Court’s annunciation of the “special relationship” between students
and school officials:
The special relationship between teacher and student also distin-
guishes the setting within which schoolchildren operate. Law
enforcement officers function as adversaries of criminal suspects.
These officers have the responsibility to investigate criminal
activity, to locate and arrest those who violate our laws, and to
facilitate the charging and bringing of such persons to trial. Rarely
does this type of adversarial relationship exist between school
authorities and pupils.426
Thus, SROs and school officials acting in concert with law enforcement, even in the
post-exigency BHS example, would be required to follow the Court’s black-letter
command as it applies to smartphones: “[G]et a warrant.”427
422 See supra Section I.B.
423 See supra Sections I.B, III.D. Other scholars support this proposition. See generally
Pinard, supra note 92.
424 See supra Section III.D.
425 In this case, most jurisdictions would apply a reasonable suspicion standard, focusing
on who is exercising control over the search. See supra Section III.D.
426 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 349–50 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
427 Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 403 (2014).
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B. A Key Policy Recommendation for Schools
Justice Alito notes in Riley that the courts cannot solve this problem alone.428 He
argues in the final lines of Riley,
[I]t would be very unfortunate if privacy protection in the 21st
century were left primarily to the federal courts using the blunt
instrument of the Fourth Amendment. Legislatures, elected by
the people, are in a better position than [courts] are to assess and
respond to the changes that have already occurred and those that
almost certainly will take place in the future.429
Indeed, state legislatures and Congress must act to address this complicated issue
and help strike the right balance between protecting students and protecting students’
privacy. In particular, due to the decentralized nature of American K–12 education,
state legislatures and local school districts can likely act more nimbly than Congress
and tailor remedies to the ideal of each state or locale. To aid them in that task and
with special attention paid to diverting students from the school-to-prison pipeline,
this Comment adopts one particular research-based alternative to zero tolerance
policies—school-based threat assessment.430
School-based threat assessment affords schools a research-based method of
assessing when a student’s behavior compels law enforcement intervention and, there-
fore, targets the exact issue discussed here: What do schools do when students make
a threat of violence?431 Following a tragedy like Parkland, schools are understandably
concerned that their failure to take swift action will result in severe consequences.432
There are, however, consequences when schools overact in response to threats.433
This method attempts to strike a balance between inaction and action.
The foremost inquiry of school-based threat assessment is “whether a student
poses a threat, not whether a student has made a threat.”434 The model also requires
the creation of a panel of law enforcement, school officials, mental health professions,
and other professionals who work in schools, one of whom should know the student
being assessed.435 The panel decides whether the student poses a safety risk,436 not
428 See id. at 408 (Alito, J., concurring in part).
429 Id.
430 Texas Appleseed recommends school-based threat assessment as an alternative to
school zero-tolerance policies, and that recommendation serves as the basis for this Section.
See Fowler & Craven, supra note 91.
431 Id.
432 Id.
433 Id.
434 Id.
435 Id. Coaches, guidance counselors, and SROs would likely fit in this category.
436 This recommendation is not free from flaws. For example, the discretion of the panel
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“solely . . . whether the student’s behavior falls within the elements of a Penal or
Education Code violation.”437 Because, as one psychologist notes, “Kids make
threats frequently when they are angry, upset, or just trying to gain some attention”;
evaluating and curbing these threats requires a process “calibrated to deal with kids,
not adults.”438
Studies detailing the use of this model show that “the majority of threats (70%)”
are benign.439 Importantly, though, the model does not ignore these threats; instead,
the response to these threats would be “proportional.” For instance, if the panel were
to determine a student’s Facebook threat were benign, the panel likely would not
involve police. But the consequence should “aim to teach students why even a threat
of violence is harmful.”440
The advantages of this system are clear. Threats that aren’t substantive are still
punished so that behaviors are curbed in the future, and students are not immediately
arrested.441 Therefore, school officials and law enforcement officers cease to waste
law enforcement and criminal justice system resources, criminalize natural behav-
iors of undeveloped adolescent brains, and feed the school-to-prison pipeline.442
Moreover, school-based threat assessment complements the legal standard this
Comment suggests for searches of juvenile students’ smartphones because it helps
school officials determine the appropriate scope of a search. Thus, while both ideas
are imperfect, they could work in tandem to more appropriately balance school
safety and student privacy.
CONCLUSION
The Parkland tragedy highlighted a forgotten axiom: Each new generation of
juvenile students brings change with them—new culture, new technology, and new
is arguably subject to abuse, groupthink mentality, and bias. To counteract this, the school
district could impose a strict documentation requirement on the panel and have the panel’s
recommendation independently verified by an outside source. As cost is always a consideration
when implementing new policy, school districts could partner with local universities and utilize
psychologists-in-training, under the supervision of duly accredited psychology professors,
to verify the panel’s findings and recommendations. As is the case for law school clinics, these
psychology “clinics” could benefit juvenile students and future psychology professionals
while offering a low-cost check on the panel’s decisions. Cf. Barton Juvenile Defender Clinic,
EMORY U. SCH. L., http://law.emory.edu/academics/clinics/barton-juvenile-defender-clinic
.html [https://perma.cc/5LMC-H6AD] (last visited Apr. 14, 2020) (“Student attorneys rep-
resent child clients in juvenile court and . . . the Juvenile Defender Clinic aspires to help
students understand the impact of the legal system on a community.”).
437 See Fowler & Craven, supra note 91.
438 Id.
439 Id.
440 See id.
441 See id.
442 See id.
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behavior. With the advent of the smartphone, juvenile students carry a device capable
of much more than the Supreme Court could have predicted when it decided T.L.O.
in 1985.443 In 2014, when the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Riley, it
attempted to modernize, recognizing the illimitable information smartphones can
access, send, and store by vesting a heightened privacy interest in smartphones.444
But the Court has been hesitant to apply Riley to T.L.O., to extend Fourth Amend-
ment privacy rights fully to juvenile students.445
Instead, the Parkland shooting and other salient instances of school violence have
prompted school officials, SROs, and law enforcement to work together as a stopgap
solution, filling the void by referring our youth to the criminal justice system at
recently increasing rates.
However, the solution requires more than criminalizing student misbehavior; it
demands a compromise that respects both a school’s legitimate interest in keeping
students safe and a student’s heightened privacy interest in her smartphone. This
Comment, in reconciling T.L.O. and Riley, suggests that compromise. Its “reason-
able suspicion-plus” standard, accounting for the proliferation of smartphones
among juvenile students, would require school officials to memorialize the reason
for and scope of their searches in order to prevent unreasonable violations of students’
Fourth Amendment rights. It also recommends imposing a probable cause standard
on SROs and school officials acting in concert with law enforcement. This would
close the loophole left open by courts’ exclusive application of T.L.O. in the school
search context.
This new standard would allow schools to act deftly to protect students from
violence, and it would protect students’ privacy interests in their smartphones while
respecting the Supreme Court’s classification of schools as “special needs” zones.446
Moreover, when coupled with a research-based policy like school-based threat assess-
ment, fewer juvenile students will be forced into the criminal justice system. The result-
ing rebalance of schools’ interests and students’ privacy with the added flourish of
research-based policy could curb threats and reduce criminal charges for our youth
in this post-Parkland era.
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